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1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/SR.1
24 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE I

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 19 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

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95-80718 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

1. The CHAIRMAN expressed the hope that the Committee, as a group of technocrats, diplomats and experts, would be able to work in a constructive, dispassionate, objective and flexible manner and leave the discussion of political issues to the plenary meetings. It would be the purpose of the Committee to give consistency to the import of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to seek to strengthen it in anticipation of the new life which all hoped would be conferred on it. If the Treaty failed to take account of the legitimate security aspirations of both the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States, it would be a defective instrument in promoting the global non-proliferation norm.

2. The Committee would endeavour to review the implementation of the Treaty in all candour and objectivity, and it would then try to relate it to the expectations of States parties and make recommendations on action to be taken in order to strengthen the Treaty and its regime, as it entered a new phase of its life. The issues, which might be complex and at times contentious, would relate, inter alia, to the lateral transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and related technology for weapons purposes; qualitative improvements of such weapons and their vectors; efforts at nuclear disarmament, including relevant negotiations leading thereto; security assurances; and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Committee should approach its work in a spirit of cooperative endeavour since its members shared a common interest in the survival of the Treaty.

3. He drew attention to the items allocated to the Committee for review, as provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, which were set out in annex V to the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/1). He noted that both Main Committee I and Main Committee II would be dealing with article VII; some coordination between the two would therefore be required. Main Committee I was asked to concentrate on the aspects of the article related to non-proliferation, disarmament and international security.

4. He suggested that the work of the Committee should be divided into three phases: first, a general exchange of views and the introduction of any proposals by delegations; second, a more in-depth review, taking the various provisions of the Treaty assigned to the Committee one by one; and third, consideration of the report to the Drafting Committee, which was to be submitted by Friday, 5 May. He further suggested that, to make the best use of the time available, a working group might be established to examine the issue of security assurances, as well as the aforementioned aspects of article VII. A provisional programme of work had been circulated. Lastly, he pointed out that summary records would be provided only for the formal open meetings of the Main Committee.

5. Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had some reservations regarding the advisability of having meetings open to

non-governmental organizations and the press. That would not necessarily be conducive to the full and frank exchange that was desirable and it might lead to polemical discussions which would be better avoided, given the limited time available for the Committee's work. He wondered what practice would be adopted in that respect by the other Main Committees and would welcome any clarification from the President of the Conference or from the Chairman.

6. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) requested additional clarification regarding the way in which the consideration of matters pertaining to article VII would be divided between Main Committee I and Main Committee II. His delegation was particularly interested in that subject, especially the question of regional arrangements regarding nuclear-free zones.

7. The CHAIRMAN said that, at the current stage of the Committee's work, it would be difficult to define the precise division of work between the two Main Committees with regard to article VII. He would, however, clarify the issue as soon as possible.

8. In reply to the question raised by the representative of the United Kingdom, he said that the issue was being considered by the President of the Conference, who would shortly produce specific recommendations.

9. Mr. EFFENDI (Indonesia) expressed support for the programme of work as set out by the Chairman.

10. The CHAIRMAN said he took it that the Committee wished to adopt the programme of work.

11. It was so decided.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS

12. Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany) said that, despite laudable efforts, the need for further nuclear disarmament was undeniable. His delegation would continue to urge further energetic steps in that direction, since it attached great importance to maintaining the credibility of the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. In that connection, he welcomed the recent declaration by four of the nuclear-weapon States that they were prepared to live up to their commitments under article VI of the Treaty and he hoped that declaration would be reflected in the final document of the Conference.

13. Now that the cessation of the arms race had been achieved, the next task was to reduce the levels of nuclear forces as quickly, safely, securely and transparently as possible. His delegation welcomed the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States regarding security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995) represented an important step forward.

14. His Government favoured the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. Germany had long since renounced all kinds of weapons of mass destruction and had demonstrated that it had not resulted in any disadvantage in competing with others in the international arena.

15. The issue of the extension of the Treaty should not be used as a lever to press for nuclear disarmament. There was no acceptable alternative to cooperative threat reduction based on universal treaty regimes such as the non-proliferation Treaty. In the absence of customary international law banning the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the Treaty gave non-nuclear-weapon States the assurance that their neighbours could not pursue nuclear-weapons ambitions. It would be unwise to gamble with the Treaty by adding conditions regarding its extension. His delegation was ready to join ranks with the non-nuclear-weapon States represented at the Conference to insist, with pragmatic perseverance, on the implementation of all contractual obligations.

16. Mr. STARR (Australia) said that it was important to recognize that all States derived major benefits from, and had major interests at stake in, the continued success of the non-proliferation Treaty. It should be the aim of the Conference to make decisions which would allow the Treaty to operate more effectively so that it could continue to meet its objectives in the face of future challenges. The key objectives most relevant to the work of the Committee should be to reconfirm, and establish irrevocably for the future, nuclear non-proliferation as the standard for international behaviour; to continue and accelerate the progress which was being made towards eventual nuclear disarmament; and to achieve universal membership of the Treaty.

17. With regard to articles I and II and the first three preambular paragraphs of the Treaty, he said it was imperative that all States parties should comply scrupulously with their basic obligations. His delegation would welcome a reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States that their nuclear cooperation was, and would be at all times, consistent with article I. With reference to article II, recent instances of non-compliance by certain non-nuclear-weapon States had clearly underlined the need to strengthen the verification provisions of the Treaty. He would expect that to be a principle issue discussed in Main Committee II.

18. With regard to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty, he said it was clear that the nuclear arms race had now been reversed, and that nuclear disarmament of historic proportions was under way. The United States and the Russian Federation were each destroying about 2,000 nuclear weapons a year; several States previously belonging to the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had achieved non-nuclear-weapon status; and a number of nuclear-weapon States had taken unilateral decisions to dismantle considerable quantities of weapons.

19. A comprehensive test-ban treaty was now attainable. His Government intended to be an original signatory to that treaty which, by preventing the development and deployment of new generations of advanced nuclear weapons, would represent an important step towards global security. The negotiations for such a treaty had produced an advanced draft which reflected a new convergence on a number of key issues. The outstanding questions facing negotiators were well defined and, although there was still a considerable amount of work to be done, the conclusion of the new treaty was within reach.

20. With regard to security assurances, the recent adoption by consensus of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) represented a significant advance,

establishing strengthened international expectations and norms against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in respect of non-nuclear-weapon States. It should also be recalled that security assurances could be pursued and entrenched by means of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as those established under the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He also welcomed the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had agreed to establish a negotiating committee on the cessation of the production of fissile material for explosive purposes.

21. The non-proliferation Treaty had thus played a vital role in creating the conditions of confidence about non-proliferation that had allowed nuclear disarmament to proceed. Australia, however, shared the disappointment of many non-nuclear-weapon States that more progress had not been possible under article VI during the cold war.

22. It would like to see in the final document a strong endorsement of the objective of further progress in nuclear disarmament and a clear statement from the five nuclear-weapon States about the future of the nuclear disarmament process which would reaffirm the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. In that context, the recent reaffirmation by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament was welcome. The final document should also contain the firmest appeal to those few States which had so far not become parties to the Treaty to reconsider their position. In the view of his delegation, the act that would best convince those outside the Treaty that there were sound reasons for acceding to it would undoubtedly be the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

23. It was of the utmost importance that the United States and the Russian Federation should move towards a START III agreement, and that the three other nuclear-weapon States should join in the formal negotiating process for disarmament at an early opportunity. The best way to provide such an impetus was to ensure a climate in which there were strong assurances against proliferation. A world free of nuclear weapons was not conceivable in the absence of universal membership of the non-proliferation Treaty and complete and permanent assurances of non-proliferation.

24. Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) said that the decision on whether to extend the non-proliferation Treaty would flow naturally from the discussions to be held during the course of the Conference. In the view of his delegation, the Conference was already a success by the mere fact of its having been convened; an atmosphere had been created that would encourage intensified debate on a number of issues pertaining to nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in general. The world situation in 1995 was very different from the one prevailing in 1990, when the fourth review conference had been held. In Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, the atmosphere was now much more propitious for a total prohibition of nuclear weapons. Changes in the international scene, in particular the geopolitical and military situation resulting from the end of the cold war, had led to the START I and START II Treaties. It was to be hoped that further reductions in nuclear weapons would be made possible by a START III treaty.

25. The convening of the current Conference had had a beneficial effect on certain disarmament negotiations, such as the talks on a comprehensive test-ban treaty held recently in Geneva. It was encouraging to note the willingness of the five nuclear Powers to offer security assurances, as evidenced by the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995). A move had also been made to establish a committee to conduct negotiations to prohibit the production of fissile material for military purposes.

26. The task now facing Main Committee I was to find a formula that would reflect a collective appreciation of the meaning of the provisions of the Treaty allocated to it for review, especially article VI and the preambular paragraphs relating to disarmament.

27. Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom) said that the United Kingdom took its non-proliferation obligations under article I of the Treaty very seriously and had fully complied with them. His Government had also advocated and supported a number of actions taken by the international community in order to ensure compliance with article II, including action in respect of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

28. It welcomed the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the progress made towards nuclear disarmament, including the dramatic reductions in United States and Russian nuclear arsenals, most recently those agreed under the START I and START II Treaties. The United Kingdom had always maintained its nuclear forces at a minimum level and, in recent years, had adjusted its nuclear arsenal to reflect the improvements in the international security environment. As a result, by the end of the 1990s, the total number of warheads in the United Kingdom stockpile would be 21 per cent lower than it had been in the 1970s, and the total explosive power of those warheads would be 59 per cent lower than in the 1970s. The total number of operational warheads in the stockpile would be 30 per cent less than in the 1970s, and the total explosive power of those warheads would be 63 per cent lower than in the 1970s. The United Kingdom had therefore already contributed directly to reductions in nuclear forces and was continuing to do so. A world in which United States and Russian nuclear forces were numbered in the hundreds rather than the thousands would be one in which his Government would respond to the challenge of multilateral nuclear arms control talks.

29. The United Kingdom was strongly in favour of concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty and was playing a full and active role in the negotiations which had begun in Geneva in January 1994. His Government had recently agreed that there should be no exemption for "tests in exceptional circumstances", the so-called "safety tests".

30. His Government had welcomed the recent agreement, at the Conference on Disarmament, to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or for other nuclear explosive devices. As a demonstration of his Government's commitment to those negotiations, the Secretary of State of the United Kingdom had announced recently that the country had ceased the production of fissile material for explosive purposes.

31. The United Kingdom had played an active part in initiating and elaborating Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances. It had also supported many other measures which contributed to the goal of general and complete disarmament. It had taken the original initiative which had ultimately led to the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and fully supported recent efforts to strengthen it. It had also played an active part in the negotiations on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. At the regional level, the United Kingdom had consistently sought verifiable reductions in conventional arms in Europe, and had played a full part in the negotiations which had led to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

32. The United Kingdom was thus fully committed to practical disarmament and non-proliferation measures, including negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remained its ultimate goal. If the world community was to build further on the momentum created by recent disarmament successes, it must ensure that the essential framework of stability and predictability provided by the Treaty was made permanent.

33. Mr. FRIEDRICH (Switzerland) pointed out that questions concerning the implementation of the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty relating to nuclear disarmament and security assurances were the main issues preventing the Governments of many countries, including his own, from readily endorsing the idea of an unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty. It was therefore of the utmost importance that the Committee should conduct a comprehensive analysis of the current situation and that its conclusions should be reflected clearly and in detail in its report, as well as in the final document of the Conference. In the view of his delegation, non-proliferation was not an end in itself; it should be accompanied by the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

34. His country attached very high priority to the reduction of existing arsenals to the lowest possible level. In accepting an indefinite extension of the Treaty, Switzerland was placing its trust in the nuclear-weapon States, assuming that they would move with determination, and without concern for their own national prestige, towards nuclear disarmament.

35. The provisions of article VI had not been met. The number of warheads in the possession of the nuclear-weapon States had increased considerably over the years, and it had not been until the end of the cold war that two of those States had finally agreed to substantial reductions in their arsenals. Even so, the number of warheads remained almost the same as 25 years earlier; moreover, the current warheads were more efficient. His delegation hoped that by the next review conference, in the year 2000, all five nuclear-weapon States would agree on a schedule for substantially reducing their arsenals. Moreover, at the present Conference, all the States parties to the Treaty should reaffirm their commitment to the total elimination, within a specific time-frame, of all weapons of mass destruction.

36. The dismantling of nuclear weapons should be carried out with due regard for the environment. The fissile materials thus obtained must be placed under international controls and must never be used to manufacture new weapons. The production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes must be stopped. His delegation welcomed the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of a committee to deal with that matter and hoped that its work would be successful. His Government had stated its position in favour of an indefinite extension of the Treaty in the strong hope that, by the next review conference, a treaty on the cessation of the production of fissile material for explosive purposes would be in force.

37. His delegation was pleased to note that negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty had finally begun in the Conference on Disarmament. His Government was disappointed that agreement had not been reached on the essential elements of such a treaty before the current Conference. The idea of providing for exceptions to the principle of a comprehensive test ban was incompatible with the spirit of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Any exception would have a negative impact on the environment and would cast doubt on the determination to ensure a permanent halt to experimental nuclear explosions.

38. The issue of security assurances was another area in which the non-nuclear-weapon States still had some concerns. The nuclear-weapon States should undertake, in a legally binding multilateral treaty, never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which had renounced the use of nuclear weapons. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) represented a positive step in that direction.

39. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America), referring to articles I and II and the first three preambular paragraphs of the Treaty, said that the Committee should bear in mind that the five nuclear-weapon States were now all parties to the non-proliferation Treaty; that the Treaty had proved its value in providing assurances to all States that their neighbours were not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons; and that there was near-universal support for the norm of non-proliferation. Efforts to secure universal accession to the Treaty should be encouraged, and States should be discouraged from pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities. Violations of the Treaty should be expressly condemned, and emphasis should be placed on the need for a strong international response to evidence of violations. The parties to the Treaty should express concern about the serious threat posed by nuclear proliferation, and about all States which remained outside the Treaty and not subject to comprehensive safeguards agreements.

40. With regard to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, he said that, with the end of the cold war, the climate for arms control and disarmament had never been better. The role of nuclear weapons in United States national security strategy had never been lower. The United States took its commitments under article VI very seriously. Not only had it compiled a strong record of accomplishments in that regard, but it had reaffirmed its commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remained its ultimate goal.

41. The United States was dismantling up to 2,000 nuclear weapons per year. Since 1988, it had reduced defence expenditures for strategic nuclear weapons by almost two thirds, cut military personnel performing duties with strategic nuclear forces by a similar amount, and reduced its active strategic nuclear stockpile by nearly 60 per cent, and its non-strategic nuclear stockpile by 90 per cent. By the year 2003, with the implementation of the START II Treaty, the United States would have reduced its total nuclear forces by 80 per cent. The United States had not tested a nuclear weapon in almost three years. His Government was fully committed to the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and was determined to complete that treaty at the earliest possible time. In fact, it was prepared to conclude that it had already conducted its last nuclear test.

42. The United States had ceased the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes and had already removed massive amounts of nuclear material from its military stockpile. It had recently committed itself to removing 200 metric tons of fissile material from its nuclear stockpile and some material excess to weapons needs had been submitted to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The United States actively supported negotiations on a fissile-material cut-off convention, and welcomed the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee to conduct negotiations to that end.

43. The United States was not manufacturing new nuclear weapons and had halted research and development of third-generation weapons. Its nuclear weapons were not targeted against any country and United States bombers no longer stood on day-to-day alert. His Government had also reaffirmed long-standing policies on negative and positive security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty, as evidenced by Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

44. In short, there had been overwhelming success in satisfying the undertakings given under article VI. Progress had been achieved not only in nuclear disarmament, but also in bilateral and multilateral agreements on other weapons of mass destruction, most notably chemical weapons.

45. The foregoing list of accomplishments underscored the direction in which the United States was heading. Its commitment to complete the journey was unwavering. However, fulfilment of article VI was the responsibility of all parties, and all must do their part to achieve arms limits and other measures to ease regional tensions and arms competition. It was important that the Conference should acknowledge the contribution that the arms control efforts of the nuclear-weapon States had made to a strong non-proliferation regime, as well as the importance of a strong non-proliferation regime to further nuclear reductions.

46. On the question of security assurances, the United States had always recognized the importance of addressing the special needs of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty for assurances that would alleviate their legitimate security concerns. Substantial progress had been made and the Conference should welcome the recent unanimous adoption of Security

Council resolution 984 (1995), which took note of the national declarations by the five nuclear-weapon States on security assurances.

47. In conclusion, he reiterated the importance of the non-proliferation Treaty and the need for its indefinite extension without conditions. The Treaty established the only international, legally-binding obligation on the nuclear-weapon States to work towards eventually laying down their arms and it provided the stable climate in which the nuclear-weapon States could continue that process. A world without a permanent non-proliferation Treaty would not provide a climate conducive to future progress.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/SR.2
25 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

MAIN COMMITTEE I

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 20 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

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GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. MAZLAN (Malaysia) said that the Conference offered a unique opportunity for States parties to the Treaty to advance the cause of global nuclear disarmament. It was important to ensure that the decision to be taken would be based on an objective evaluation of the Treaty and would best serve the interests of the States parties in their quest for global security. The notion of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons was an entirely practical proposition which the international community should strive to attain.

2. The nuclear-weapon States' fulfilment of their obligations under the preamble and article VI was far from satisfactory. Recent achievements in the area of disarmament were of limited scope and fell far short of expectations; the world was still a dangerous place.

3. His Government's decision on the extension of the Treaty would depend on the result of the work of the three Main Committees. Regarding Main Committee I, his delegation would press for the inclusion of positive language reflecting unfaltering commitments, particularly from the nuclear-weapon States, on the following issues: a programme of action by the nuclear-weapon States in respect of negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons; establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; cessation of the further production of fissile materials for weapons purposes; internationally negotiated, legally binding security assurances; and adherence by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear-free zones. The nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate greater commitment to disarmament through a programme of action to eliminate all nuclear weapons within a ten-year period beginning in 1996.

4. His delegation would also request a guarantee that States parties could exercise their right to withdraw from the Treaty, in accordance with article X. That right, together with the aforementioned programme of action, were prerequisites for his delegation's agreement to an extension of the Treaty.

5. A comprehensive test-ban treaty, which would end the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, was essential to the halting of the nuclear-arms race. His delegation would work for a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to conclude a verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty by the end of 1996, and for the maintenance by the nuclear-weapon States of their moratorium on testing.

6. The cessation of the further production of fissile materials for weapons purposes was another vital link in non-proliferation measures. Encouraging progress was already being made. A non-discriminatory and verifiable convention should be drawn up at the earliest possible date, banning the production and stockpiling of such materials.

7. Recent efforts in the area of security assurances, while welcome, were clearly inadequate, failing to meet the call by the non-nuclear-weapon States for legally binding security assurances. The nuclear-weapon States should accept a binding international instrument on the subject. Referring to recent

positive developments in the field of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, he said the nuclear-weapon States should also show a positive attitude to the creation of such zones and to the establishment of appropriate guarantees.

8. The full and fair implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would lead the international community on the road to complete nuclear disarmament. The security of future generations would depend on whether the international community, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, had the courage to grasp that opportunity.

9. Mr. MERNIER (Belgium) said that the discouraging results of the early years of the Treaty had been considerably improved upon recently, since the trend towards escalation had been reversed, with a number of highly significant reductions, such as those achieved by the START agreements, in the world's nuclear arsenal, and the moratoriums on nuclear testing accepted by four of the nuclear-weapon Powers. He hoped that they would soon be joined by China.

10. Although the level of nuclear armaments was still too high, the international community was visibly on the right track, and the fact that the multiplication of nuclear-weapon States had been largely averted was another example of success which was of itself sufficient to justify the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Universality was an important goal, and those States which were not parties to the Treaty should be encouraged to accede to it.

11. Once extended, the Treaty would need to be strengthened and reinforced by other measures, such as the current moratoriums on nuclear testing, and efforts to ban the production of fissile material for weapons use. Steps of a more political nature were also needed, such as the security assurances desired by the non-nuclear-weapon States, and the establishment of additional nuclear-free zones.

12. The overall picture was positive, but there was still a long way to go, and the work remaining to be done in the interest of nuclear non-proliferation required a stable and permanent legal framework which the Treaty could provide.

13. Mr. ARAR (Turkey) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had reduced the risk of nuclear war, but dangers still existed. A huge majority of States currently agreed on the necessity of further reductions in nuclear weapons and maintained the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.

14. He welcomed the steps which had recently been made, particularly those concerning the States of the former Soviet Union. The comprehensive test-ban treaty, once concluded, would play a vital role. Another important step would be the conclusion of a treaty providing for a cut-off in the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and he welcomed the current efforts in that area at the Conference on Disarmament.

15. He also welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on positive and negative security assurances, sponsored by the nuclear-weapon States. Despite its weaknesses, the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the sole assurance of nuclear non-proliferation and the only multilateral treaty providing commitment to nuclear disarmament. His delegation was of the view that only a permanent

Non-Proliferation Treaty could ensure those two crucial elements of global security, which was why it supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty.

16. Mr. TYUTYUNNIK (Ukraine) stressed the need to promote efforts to bring about a nuclear-weapon-free world. In the past five years, nuclear arsenals had been significantly reduced and the number of the so-called "threshold" States with nuclear weapons in their territory had decreased. At the same time, the number of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had grown. Ukraine, which was the first State in history to renounce voluntarily nuclear weapons, was also proceeding, together with the Russian Federation, to destroy the third most powerful nuclear arsenal in the world.

17. His country had repeatedly expressed its support for the indefinite extension of the Treaty as a key instrument for weapons monitoring and disarmament. At the same time, the possibility of unconditional extension seemed very problematic. The main condition for strengthening the Treaty and for its indefinite extension was clear and conscientious compliance by all States parties with its provisions. In that regard, the principles concerning nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament put forward by the Government of South Africa should be given careful consideration. The granting of security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties was of particular importance among the overall measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. The absence of such assurances in the Treaty was its "Achilles heel". The adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995) had been an important step towards eliminating that shortcoming. Lastly, Ukraine supported the idea of elaborating a legally binding international instrument on security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties.

18. Mr. PATOKALLIO (Finland) said that without the strict implementation of articles I and II, which contained the basic obligations of the Treaty, its objectives could not be fulfilled and it would lose every shred of credibility.

19. The obligations under article II had been challenged twice since the Fourth Review Conference. In the case of Iraq, non-compliance had been established beyond the shadow of a doubt. In the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, doubts still remained, and needed to be removed.

20. Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons called for continuous effort. The current Conference should reaffirm that non-proliferation had become a global norm of behaviour. It should also welcome the accession since 1990 of a large number of States. The accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as non-nuclear-weapon States was commendable. With the accession of South Africa, the Treaty counted among its parties the first State which had voluntarily rolled back its nuclear-weapon programme. The non-proliferation regime had been significantly strengthened, and the Treaty was approaching universality. Further efforts needed to be made to that end.

21. The ending of the nuclear-arms race was a historic step in the implementation of article VI. Thanks to the START treaties, the two biggest nuclear-weapon States were in the process of reducing their nuclear arsenals by two thirds. The Conference should stress that the implementation of those

treaties in the fastest manner compatible with safety and security was of key importance. The United States and the Russian Federation had taken a number of other arms-reduction measures concerning both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. He looked forward to additional steps on the part of China, France and the United Kingdom.

22. The Conference should reaffirm that the ultimate goal of article VI was the elimination of all nuclear weapons; however, it should also be emphasized that disarmament, including conventional disarmament, was an obligation on all States parties. Positive developments had taken place, but more attention was needed, and conventional arms were used daily in conflicts around the world. Excessive accumulation of such weapons was a growing concern in many regions.

23. A comprehensive test-ban treaty was currently the single most important nuclear issue; the Conference on Disarmament should be urged to conclude its negotiations by the end of 1995. The treaty should be truly comprehensive, and effective verification was essential. Cutting off further production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes was also an important measure.

24. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties had the right to demand credible security assurances. They had no interest in providing a "free ride" to those States which had not accepted the same undertaking. Finland therefore welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

25. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) said that, while Security Council resolution 984 (1995) addressed the issues of assistance and compensation to States which were victims of a nuclear threat or attack in a fairly comprehensive manner, it offered no credible protection to non-nuclear-weapon States. Comprehensive and unqualified security assurances in the form of a legally binding instrument were a legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Security assurances could be enhanced through complementary action to achieve regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. His delegation had been active in the area of regional disarmament and had proposed an initiative for the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. To that end, it was vital that all States in the Middle East should accede to the Treaty as a first step towards establishing such a zone.

26. Contrary to the principles of non-proliferation, the Treaty had permitted the number of nuclear weapons to increase considerably during its 25-year life span. Despite the progress achieved in the past five years, his delegation, as many other non-nuclear-weapon States, regretted that greater achievements had not been possible under article VI of the Treaty. It was imperative that the final document of the current Conference should contain a clear commitment from the five nuclear-weapon States regarding the future of the nuclear-disarmament process with a view to attaining the ultimate goal of total nuclear disarmament. The failure to reach agreement on a final text for the comprehensive test-ban treaty constituted a serious loophole in the non-proliferation regime. While some States parties saw testing as a way to ensure the safety of nuclear weapons, others believed that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would put an end to the nuclear-arms race by preventing qualitative improvement and thus vertical proliferation. His delegation supported a comprehensive and verifiable test-ban treaty - as opposed to the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty - and favoured a

non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

27. Ms. LAOSE-AJAYI (Nigeria) said that existing cooperation between nuclear-weapon States in the area of nuclear-weapon research and development undermined article I of the Treaty. Now that the cold war had ended, there was no justification for such collaboration, which the Committee should address during its review.

28. While the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had largely complied with article II, some parties, and also non-parties, to the Treaty had acquired weapons-grade materials from nuclear-weapon States. The Committee should also address that issue and discuss how Governments' export policies should be brought into line with their obligations under the Treaty.

29. The assurances provided for in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) required further clarification to strengthen their effectiveness. Since the non-nuclear-weapon States parties had renounced nuclear weapons, they deserved to be assured in treaty form that they would not be victims of the use or threat of use of such weapons. At the Fourth Review Conference in 1990, her delegation had submitted a draft proposal on negative security assurances, which could serve as the basis for the Committee to express, in its current report, a commitment to draw up a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

30. Despite significant progress towards disarmament in recent years, there continued to be a need for greater transparency in nuclear disarmament. A nuclear-weapons register of qualitative and quantitative measures for nuclear disarmament and a clear timetable for future disarmament were needed. Her delegation proposed that a programme for nuclear disarmament should include the conclusion and entry into force of an agreement on negative security assurances within one year, an irreversible ban on nuclear testing by 1996, the prohibition of weapons-grade fissile materials by the year 2000 and a commitment to begin negotiations for a total ban on the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by 2005.

31. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his delegation attached great importance to a comprehensive and objective review of the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which should lead to the conclusion that its indefinite and unconditional extension was vital. The Treaty had withstood the test of time and confirmed its role as an important instrument to check the spread of nuclear weapons, thus providing stability in the nuclear field without which there could be no global or regional stability. It had laid the foundation for irreversible progress towards disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, and guaranteed the development of broad international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All countries, large and small, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon, needed the Treaty.

32. The Russian Federation's commitment to the ultimate goal of complete nuclear disarmament had been reaffirmed in the declaration which it had recently made, jointly with three other nuclear-weapon States, at the Conference on

Disarmament (NPT/CONF.1995/20). As evidence that the nuclear-arms race had ceased and been reversed, he referred to the signing within the past few years by the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and subsequently the Russian Federation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty) and the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II Treaty). Under the INF Treaty, a whole class of nuclear weapons had been eliminated from the arsenals of both Powers by the end of May 1991. Moreover, in total, approximately 40 per cent of the Russian and United States nuclear arsenals would be reduced within seven years under the START I Treaty, and further considerable reductions were provided for under the START II Treaty. At the same time, under unilateral disarmament measures, the Russian Federation had already transferred a large number of its tactical nuclear weapons to central facilities and storage areas for the purpose of eliminating them.

33. The Russian Federation and the United States had also mapped out new large-scale measures. In September 1994, the Presidents of the two countries had signed a joint statement on strategic stability and nuclear security issues, under which they had agreed to expedite the implementation of bilateral strategic-arms-reduction agreements, and they had instructed their experts to intensify discussion of ways to reduce and limit the remaining nuclear forces.

34. The time had now come for other nuclear Powers to join in the process. In that connection, the President of the Russian Federation had, at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, suggested that the five nuclear Powers should develop a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability, under which the proposed measures could be carried out on a step-by-step basis in view of the differing nuclear potentials of the countries concerned.

35. His delegation welcomed the establishment, within the Conference on Disarmament, of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a multilateral convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, which should provide for appropriate verification, and was pleased to note that a mandate for negotiations had been agreed upon. The Russian Federation had already ceased to produce weapons-grade uranium, and a national programme to discontinue the production of weapons-grade plutonium was under way. In fact, the fissile materials currently produced in the Russian Federation were not being used for nuclear-weapon purposes.

36. The Russian Federation was participating actively in the negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament regarding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which it was hoped would be concluded in the near future. The moratorium on nuclear tests, to which his country would continue to adhere, created an environment conducive to the negotiations.

37. The provision of more clearly defined security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was important to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and to international stability. In that connection, he referred to the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which provided for appropriate assistance by the Security Council in the event of nuclear

aggression or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and took note of the statements by the nuclear-weapon States concerning negative assurances.

38. With regard to disarmament in the field of other types of weapons of mass destruction, the Russian Federation had been among the first to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and was preparing legislation providing for the discharge of its obligations in that connection. It also supported efforts to strengthen the regime of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and intended to work towards achieving agreement on a verification mechanism at the forthcoming multilateral negotiations.

39. Major steps had also been taken recently to limit conventional arms and armed forces in Europe.

40. The Russian Federation, like the former Soviet Union, had complied strictly with its obligations under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As for article II, the newly independent States which had previously belonged to the former Soviet Union had taken collective decisions aimed at preventing the proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons, and an international legal mechanism had been created which provided for the removal of such weapons to the Russian Federation and for the elimination of most of them. The Russian Federation remained the only nuclear-weapon State in the territory of the former Soviet Union, while Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and had fulfilled their obligations thereunder.

41. With regard to article VII, he said that the Russian Federation continued to advocate the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and elsewhere, as a means of strengthening international peace and security, and that it was a party to the relevant protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). His delegation hoped that support for the creation of nuclear-free zones would be reflected in the report of the Committee.

42. Ms. FORSYTH (New Zealand) said that recent history had underlined the fact that the risk of the spread of nuclear weapons was greatest in those regions where instability, tension and lack of cooperation remained the norm. Therefore, the Conference should aim, above all, to strengthen the climate of security in which nuclear disarmament could occur and to reaffirm without reservation its commitment to the non-proliferation and disarmament norms embodied in the Treaty. The goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world could not be achieved as long as some States with advanced nuclear capabilities remained outside the Treaty and its safeguard system. The Conference should warmly welcome recent adherents to the Treaty and express a determination to secure its universal application. Full compliance with articles I and II was essential to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The record of compliance with article II had been tarnished by the actions of two States parties to the Treaty, Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Both nuclear-weapon

States and non-nuclear-weapon States should recommit themselves to strict and full observance of those articles.

43. The aim of the Committee, in reviewing the implementation of article VI, should be to reinforce the moves towards nuclear disarmament of the past five years and offer specific recommendations for the future. Such recommendations should include the conclusion without delay of negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The commitment of all five nuclear-weapon States to the uninterrupted observance of testing moratoriums would be a welcome signal of seriousness in that regard. States parties should also urge the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, States parties should discuss verifiable measures to bring a permanent end to vertical proliferation by stopping the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems and the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In addition, the Conference should encourage further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the five nuclear-weapon States.

44. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had long held that they were entitled to effective international arrangements to assure them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending their elimination. While some had already received such assurances through the operation of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Conference should consider what further measures could be pursued in a multilateral framework such as the Conference on Disarmament to strengthen security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States which had made firm non-proliferation commitments.

45. Mr. ERRERA (France) reviewed the many measures France had taken to reduce its nuclear forces and scale down its nuclear-weapons programmes adding that, to promote transparency, the President of France had given, in 1994, a full account of all French nuclear forces. In addition, France had just given the non-nuclear-weapon States positive and negative security assurances the wording of which had been harmonized with those of four of the five nuclear Powers.

46. Now that the nuclear-arms race was over, France hoped that the START I Treaty would be fully implemented. Negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear tests were progressing, and he hoped that a treaty would be included without delay. France welcomed the decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament regarding negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices and urged that negotiations should begin forthwith. France, together with the United States, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom had just solemnly reaffirmed its commitment to the pursuit of negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

47. As for other disarmament measures, France would seek to promote universal ratification of the Chemical-Weapons Convention, and to establish a verification regime for the biological-weapons Convention, strengthen the ban on anti-personnel mines and to help develop regional arms control.

48. Strengthening of the non-proliferation regime - in particular the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty - was a basic element for continuing the general disarmament process.

49. Mr. KIM (Republic of Korea) said that, while his delegation considered that the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be extended indefinitely, efforts to eliminate discrimination and address the shortcomings of the non-proliferation regime should continue. An international norm delegitimizing the development and possession of nuclear weapons under any circumstances should be further strengthened with a view to achieving complete non-proliferation. The Republic of Korea would continue to participate in the diplomatic campaign for nuclear non-proliferation at both the regional and global levels.

50. Over the past 25 years, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had provided a firm and dependable foundation for preventing nuclear proliferation and had served as the primary legal and political deterrent to the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons. In order to build on the positive global perception of the Treaty, to which more than 170 countries had become parties, it was important for both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to make concerted efforts, on a non-discriminatory basis, to comply in good faith with their respective obligations under the Treaty.

51. The legitimate concerns about the discriminatory aspects of the Treaty expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States could be resolved if and when the goal of comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament was achieved with the full participation of all nuclear-weapon States. One of the most urgent tasks for the nuclear-weapon States was to take the lead by substantially diminishing the political and military significance of nuclear weapons so that none of the non-nuclear weapon States would attempt to develop them.

52. Bilateral efforts between the United States and the Russian Federation to implement nuclear disarmament provided further evidence of the progress made towards nuclear disarmament. The early ratification of the START II Treaty would make it possible to achieve epoch-making progress by the year 2003. In addition to such bilateral efforts, multilateral efforts were needed towards comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament. His delegation noted with satisfaction the tangible progress made recently in the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which might contribute to the successful extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Negotiations on the test-ban treaty should be concluded at the earliest date and with the full participation of all States concerned.

53. The consensus adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the issue of fissile material for weapons purposes had marked real progress towards the further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. His delegation looked forward to the early establishment and operation of that body.

54. The adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances had contributed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty. His delegation noted with satisfaction the collective initiative made by all nuclear-weapon States in dealing with comprehensive security assurances, both

positive and negative. That was an important step towards achieving the extension of the Treaty and the further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

55. Mr. DUMORE (Netherlands) stressed the need for the safe processing of fissile material resulting from the dismantling of nuclear warheads. That was time-consuming and costly, and should be carried out in an environmentally sound manner. The Government of the Netherlands had recently contributed $1 million for such a project in Ukraine.

56. He also stressed the significance of Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which represented an important step in the field of security assurances by including both negative and positive security assurances.

57. He welcomed the agreement reached by the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive purposes through the establishment of an ad hoc committee.

58. His delegation fully supported the current negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. At its 1994 session, the Conference had made important progress in drafting the nuclear-test-ban treaty. With regard to verification, much work had been done in preparation for an international monitoring system, which, by monitoring possible test explosions, should be the core of the verification system. In that regard, the agreement reached at the end of 1994 concerning monitoring techniques had been of great importance.

59. The negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty were building on those foundations, and further substantial work had been done on verification, particularly on-site inspection. A major breakthrough had been reached with regard to the scope of the treaty, and there was currently a much clearer prospect of what it would eventually prohibit. In addition, there seemed to be consensus that a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be of indefinite duration, an example which the 1995 Review and Extension Conference should follow.

60. Mr. WESTDAL (Canada) said that, although complete nuclear disarmament had not been achieved and although some States had still not signed the Treaty, and indeed some States parties had even violated the Treaty, nevertheless articles I, II and VI had served to protect the international community. The Treaty had profoundly altered attitudes towards nuclear weapons, stigmatizing and delegitimizing them. At the time the Treaty had been drafted, some had feared that there could be as many as 20 or 30 nuclear-weapon States by the end of the century. Moreover, all five declared nuclear-weapon States were parties to the Treaty, had strengthened their security assurances and were trying to put an end to testing. All had agreed to negotiate the end of the production of fissile material for weapons. There were currently 178 States parties to the Treaty, an eloquent statistic which gave cause for hope.

61. The prerequisites for complete nuclear disarmament were beyond the world's current imagination and would be realized only with the establishment of political institutions and laws that were more effective than existing ones. It was certain, however, that the international community needed to instil global

values of compassion, restraint and the honour of compromise in the peaceful resolution of disputes. In the meantime, the massive number of nuclear weapons must be reduced and those that remained must be tightly sheathed. In that regard, the first obvious step was to make the Treaty permanent and to keep the promises embodied in it. That implied a comprehensive nuclear test-ban, a cut-off in the production of fissile material for weapons, and treaties to supplement START I and II. It also meant more nuclear-weapon-free zones and universal accession.

62. While there continued to be horrors in the world, from Bosnia to Burundi and beyond, the international community must take advantage of the current situation in which there was no conflict or strife between major Powers. Canada advocated permanence with accountability: permanence, because there appeared to be no circumstances under which it would ever make sense to "lose" the Treaty; and accountability, because the profound promises inherent in the Treaty would not be kept without vigilance and hard work. Accordingly, the Governments of States parties must be held to account for their custody of the values of the Treaty and the fulfilment of its obligations.

63. Mr. NEAGU (Romania) stressed the obligations of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to comply with their undertaking to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and to pursue nuclear disarmament. The Treaty had proved to be a strong barrier to nuclear proliferation, despite the long-lasting arms race. The final document of the current Conference should include a call for universal adherence to the Treaty. Building on the significant progress made in recent years, including the START I, START II and INF Treaties, the final document of the Conference should endorse the objective of further reductions of nuclear arms with the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Given the significant role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Romania strongly favoured its indefinite and unconditional extension.

64. To the extent of its possibilities, Romania had made its own contribution both to the development of a political environment favouring the dramatic achievements he had just mentioned, and to the process of disarmament. Romania had begun a process of democratization and integration into the democratic structure of Europe and the world. It had also contributed directly to the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and other global agreements. His country was also contributing to the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a landmark process which should be reflected in and encouraged by the final document of the current Conference.

65. Another significant development was the agreement reached at the Conference on Disarmament to establish a negotiating committee on the cessation of production of fissile material for explosive purposes. That effort should also be encouraged in the final document of the current Conference.

66. Romania welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the security assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States. That resolution did not, however, fully meet the expectations of many non-nuclear-weapon States, and the matter of assurances should be further pursued at the Conference on Disarmament.

That objective should also be mentioned in the final document of the current Conference.

67. Mr. WHEELER (South Africa) drew attention to the statement recently made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa at the fourth plenary meeting of the Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/SR.4). Specifically, he wished to reiterate his Foreign Minister's proposals regarding the adoption of a set of principles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the establishment of a committee to study the review process and make concrete recommendations on how to improve and strengthen the review conference mechanism. His Foreign Minister had also suggested some specific matters that might be taken up by the proposed committee (NPT/CONF.1995/SR.4, para. 9).

68. South Africa believed that the disarmament provisions in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were essential for the implementation of the Treaty. Security assurances were also a key element of the Treaty; in that regard, his Government welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995). It remained convinced, however, that the most effective way to address the issue would be to negotiate an international agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

69. During the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, South Africa had expressed its support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which afforded an added dimension to the security provided by the Treaty. Complete nuclear disarmament was the key to international and regional security. South Africa now understood that the Treaty provided greater security than did the nuclear weapons which it had destroyed.

70. Mr. GARCIA (Colombia) said that his Government hoped that both the Committee and the Conference as a whole would be able to reach some basic agreements by consensus. His country strongly supported the elimination of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction, as attested to by the fact that it was a State party to the Treaty on Antarctica, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Because of the fundamental role played by the latter in overall non-proliferation efforts, his delegation favoured extending it. The decision on extension must strengthen the Treaty and must provide the assurance that the purposes set forth in the preamble and the Treaty as a whole would be fully met.

71. His delegation considered that it was now reasonable to look forward to further reductions in nuclear weapons, and hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would be willing to work towards total elimination of such weapons. In absolute terms, however, and despite recent progress, more nuclear weapons were now in place than when the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been signed. The review must not be limited to an inventory of achievements or shortcomings; it must provide a basis for a plan of action, within a definite time-frame, for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

72. His delegation attached special importance to the following measures: immediate cessation of the arms race, with a view to general and complete disarmament under effective international control; conclusion of a comprehensive

test-ban treaty; the signing by the nuclear-weapon States of a legally binding instrument offering negative and positive security assurances; conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones and accession by the nuclear-weapon States to the instruments establishing such zones; universal application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States of non-selective access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology; and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system in order to include the activities of all the States parties to the Treaty.

73. Mr. MORADI (Iran) said that in its discussions, the Committee needed to balance the retrospective and the prospective aspects of its work, with a view to identifying specific measures to be taken to enhance the operation of the Treaty and ensuring that any extension provided for the realization of its purposes and provisions in the earliest time possible. All States parties must reaffirm their commitments under articles I and II and the first three preambular paragraphs of the Treaty. In the light of some reported cases of violations of articles I and II, the Committee should note with concern that ongoing collaboration in connection with materials and technology transfers between nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and between those States and States not parties to the Treaty, on the other hand, undermined the objectives of the Treaty.

74. Much remained to be done towards fulfilment of article VI, as nuclear arsenals far exceeded those of 1968, when the Treaty had been signed. The nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to a programme of action for total elimination of nuclear weapons within a definite time-frame.

75. With regard to article VII, his delegation would like to see a reaffirmation by the Committee of the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the expansion of the geographical scope of existing ones. The Committee should urge all nuclear-weapon States to adhere fully and unconditionally to all existing nuclear-free zones, and to commit themselves to refraining from any act that might endanger the status of such zones.

76. His delegation hoped that the Committee would underline the significance of the guarantees afforded by the Treaty and urged all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to strengthen their commitment through a legally binding instrument, either in the form of a protocol to the Treaty or as a separate instrument.

77. Mr. EKWALL (Sweden) said that it was encouraging to note the new trend in arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The significant progress made in the field of chemical and biological weapons and the steps taken to halt the arms race and reduce existing nuclear arsenals were all encouraging developments. Work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty was now well under way and an ad hoc committee had been set up to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The negative security assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States, complemented by the positive assurances provided for in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), were

further steps in the right direction. In addition, with the number of States parties to the Treaty standing at 178, it was now approaching universality.

78. All those developments must be duly reflected in the final records of the current Conference. However, the goal must remain a nuclear-weapon-free world. Further steps must be taken. The nuclear-weapon States must reaffirm their commitment to the elimination of nuclear arsenals, in the spirit of the preamble to the Treaty. In accordance with its article VI, further negotiations must be conducted in good faith on measures for nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States should also establish a specific time schedule for the implementation of such measures.

79. In the shorter time perspective, it was to be hoped that the comprehensive test-ban treaty would be concluded by the end of 1995. His delegation also looked forward to a prompt start of negotiations on a "cut-off" treaty on fissile material. Not only future production but also existing stockpiles should be the subject of such negotiations. In addition, a multilateral, legally binding international treaty on security assurances should be concluded.

80. Propitious conditions must be maintained for further efforts towards a nuclear-weapon-free world; there must be no doubt regarding the future of the Treaty. His country therefore supported its indefinite extension. At the same time, however, it called for further steps to be taken to reduce the level of nuclear arsenals.

81. Mr. LAPTSENAK (Belarus) said that his country complied strictly with all its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a successor State of a nuclear Power, Belarus had unconditionally rejected the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons. It had become a party to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and had recently signed a safeguards agreement with IAEA. His country was also conscientiously carrying out its obligations under the 1987 INF Treaty, the 1991 START I Treaty and a number of documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Thus, Belarus was continuing its efforts to ensure compliance with article VI of the Treaty.

82. Aware of the serious danger of proliferation, his country underscored the need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in central Europe. Belarus welcomed the assurances set forth in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the unilateral declarations concerning negative security assurances by the five nuclear Powers. The resolution, together with those declarations, represented an important step towards the elaboration of a legally binding international instrument and demonstrated the readiness of the nuclear Powers to conduct a single policy vis-à-vis the demands by non-nuclear-weapon countries for security assurances and assistance in case of nuclear aggression. The adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was a good step forward and should be followed by further efforts to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

83. In view of the need for greater international stability, the Conference should seek the indefinite extension of the Treaty and its universality. Belarus welcomed further steps to eliminate nuclear weapons with the participation of all nuclear Powers and was prepared to work for the speedy

conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and to participate actively in all areas of arms monitoring.

84. His delegation believed that the Conference would create a new moral climate in the world, in which any plans to acquire nuclear weapons would be considered contrary to the interests of the majority of States and, therefore, totally intolerable. That belief would be significantly strengthened by a firm pledge by the nuclear Powers to step up their efforts to comply with their obligations under the Treaty and to carry out further disarmament measures.

85. Mr. SHA Zukang (China) said that, ever since acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, China had adhered strictly to its provisions. China had faithfully fulfilled its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty and had maintained a policy of not endorsing, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons or assisting other countries in developing such weapons.

86. At the same time, the legitimate rights, interests and demands of States, in particular the developing countries, with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be taken into account. It was absolutely inadmissible to adopt double standards or, under the pretext of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to restrict or hamper the use of nuclear energy by developing countries for peaceful purposes.

87. Non-proliferation was not an end in itself but served only as an intermediate step towards the ultimate goal of the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States should negotiate and conclude, at an early date, a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, under which they would undertake to ban and destroy all their nuclear weapons under effective international supervision.

88. China had never shied away from its obligations with respect to nuclear disarmament and had undertaken a number of unilateral obligations not undertaken by any other nuclear-weapon State, namely, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and, unconditionally, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

89. China did not endorse the policy of nuclear deterrence, and the nuclear weapons that it had developed were solely for self-defence. China had always advocated the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and had never taken part in the nuclear-arms race. It had always exercised the utmost restraint with respect to the development of nuclear weapons and had kept its nuclear arsenal at a minimum level. China had also exercised restraint with regard to nuclear testing. It had conducted fewer nuclear tests than any other nuclear-weapon State. Moreover, China had never taken part in an arms race in outer space.

90. China had actively participated in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the Conference on Disarmament and would welcome the conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In that regard, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and the United States Secretary of State had signed a joint statement to promote the

conclusion of such an instrument. China welcomed the recent decision by the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to that end.

91. For the purpose of initiating negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States on a treaty of mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons, China had formally presented a draft treaty to the other four nuclear-weapon States, proposing that the five nuclear-weapon States should begin the first round of consultations in Beijing. In September 1994, the President of China and the President of the Russian Federation had issued a joint statement reaffirming the commitment of both countries to the mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons and declaring that they would no longer aim their nuclear weapons at each other. His delegation hoped that that declaration would lead to a joint declaration by all five nuclear-weapon States on the mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons.

92. China supported the establishment, on a voluntary basis and through consultations, of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones free of weapons of mass destruction. China had signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Additional Protocols II and III to the Treaty of Rarotonga. China welcomed the efforts made by the African countries to establish an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. China also supported the Middle East countries in their efforts to establish a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone and a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

93. At the request of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, China had issued statements, in December 1994 and February 1995, respectively, to provide them with security assurances. On 5 April 1995, China had issued a statement reaffirming negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States and also undertaking to provide positive security assurances to those States.

94. Mr. HERNANDEZ (Argentina) said that, as a country that developed and exported nuclear technology and material, Argentina, which had recently acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, reaffirmed its commitment to comply with articles I and II of the Treaty and encouraged all other States parties to do likewise. Argentina firmly believed that the strengthening of the safeguards system and the full implementation of the export-control regimes would help ensure compliance with those provisions. Such controls constituted a necessary guarantee accompanying the development of nuclear capabilities with a view to promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and enabling countries to export nuclear material in a responsible, safe and transparent manner.

95. A number of important developments had taken place since the 1990 Review Conference. The United States and the Russian Federation had undertaken serious measures to end the nuclear-arms race and promote nuclear disarmament. The two countries had concluded two treaties on the reduction and limitation of their strategic offensive arms (START I and START II) and were currently destroying approximately 2,000 nuclear weapons a year. Such measures had encouraged the remaining nuclear Powers to begin to consider similar steps.

96. The current favourable international climate had made it possible to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The drafting of the treaty was nearing completion, and his delegation welcomed the recent declaration by the

five nuclear Powers of their intention to negotiate intensely with a view to concluding the treaty without delay.

97. Another important development had been the agreement to establish a negotiating committee on the cut-off of production of fissile material for explosive purposes. His delegation welcomed the decision of the United States Government to place under IAEA safeguards additional fissionable material produced by the United States or resulting from the disarmament process. His delegation also welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995), in which the five nuclear Powers endorsed positive and negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

98. His delegation believed that it was essential to extend the Treaty for an indefinite period. If that was done, the Treaty could become the basis for a new disarmament process and could strengthen international détente; that would reinforce the moral value of the decision of countries which, like Argentina, had the capacity to develop nuclear arms but had explicitly renounced that capacity.

99. Mr. TANAKA (Japan) said that, in the 25 years that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been in effect, the progress in nuclear disarmament had not been as satisfactory as Japan had hoped. In fact, the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States were significantly greater in 1995 than they had been in 1970. On the other hand, the conclusion of START I and START II between the United States and the former Soviet Union had been encouraging. Moreover, the President of the United States had announced that the United States would withdraw 200 tons of fissile material for nuclear weapons from its stockpile, and had referred to reductions beyond those envisaged in START II. His delegation hoped that the United States and the Russian Federation would ratify START II as soon as possible and would continue their efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear arsenals, thereby setting an example for the other nuclear-weapon States.

100. His delegation welcomed the announcement by at least one other nuclear-weapon State regarding its readiness to reduce its nuclear weapons. The United States and the Russian Federation were continuing their disarmament efforts, and it was time for the other three nuclear-weapon States to take more serious steps towards the reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

101. The considerable progress made in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the Conference on Disarmament was also encouraging. The test-ban treaty should be concluded at the earliest possible date. Japan also appreciated the continued suspension of nuclear testing by four nuclear Powers and hoped that China would join that moratorium in the near future.

102. His delegation welcomed the decision taken at the Conference on Disarmament to establish the ad hoc committee to negotiate a fissile-material cut-off treaty and hoped that negotiations would begin as soon as possible. His delegation also appreciated the recent declaration at the Conference on Disarmament by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States expressing their intention to implement the provisions of the Non-Proliferation

Treaty, including article VI, and also Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on positive and negative security assurances.

103. With regard to article VII of the Treaty, his delegation attached great importance to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones to complement the Non-Proliferation Treaty, provided that such zones took account of local conditions. The validity of the nuclear-weapon-free zone established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco had been enhanced by the accession of Brazil, Argentina and Chile to the Treaty in 1994. His delegation also commended the efforts to draft a treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone.

104. The international community's common goal of nuclear disarmament could best be achieved by extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely. His delegation invited all States parties, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, to redouble their efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament so that future generations could live in a secure, nuclear-weapon-free world.

105. Mr. FOUATHIA (Algeria) said that the consideration of the functioning of the Non-Proliferation Treaty over the past 25 years should permit a thorough and realistic evaluation of the accomplishments of the Treaty regime, with a view to prolonging that regime, improving its credibility, and ultimately, attaining the goal of universality. The regimes governing other types of weapons of mass destruction should be borne in mind, the final goal being to rid the world of all such weapons.

106. The fact that the goals contained in the Treaty had not been fully achieved should not prevent the international community from taking a positive approach to the future of the Treaty. Considerable cuts had taken place in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States; although those cuts were welcome, the remaining stockpiles were still too large, and those States should continue their efforts to reduce them further and ultimately to ban them altogether, as had been done in the case of chemical weapons.

107. It was to be hoped that the current negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty would soon be successful, and an integrated approach to the issue of fissile materials had become a most urgent requirement. In addition, the security assurances required by the non-nuclear-weapon States should be embodied in a legally binding instrument, without any possibility of exceptions or differences of interpretation. The strengthening of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones was vital for the security of all parts of the world; in that respect, it was to be hoped that particular attention would be given to the cases of Africa and the Middle East. The provisions of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) should apply not only to Iraq, but to the whole region.

108. His delegation hoped that the Treaty would be extended and strengthened; the Government of Algeria had always believed that the security of the world would be better ensured by nuclear disarmament than by the continued possession of such weapons.

109. Mr. THAN (Myanmar) said that his delegation would welcome a renewed commitment by the States parties to abide strictly by articles I and II of the

Treaty. There was also an urgent need to strengthen its verification and safeguards provisions.

110. Despite a number of encouraging instances of bilateral and unilateral arms reductions, there was still a long way to go. Nuclear-weapon States should give to the international community a firm and solemn commitment to make further deep reductions in their arsenals, and to take measures leading to total nuclear disarmament. He concurred with the points made by previous speakers regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones and security assurances; the demands made by non-nuclear-weapon States in that respect were well justified. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was a significant step, but it had fallen far short of the expectations and requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States, having failed to create an international legal norm outlawing the use of nuclear weapons against such States; it could therefore only constitute an interim measure. At the Conference on Disarmament a number of States, including Myanmar, had recently submitted a draft protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the subject of security assurances. It could provide a useful basis for the elaboration of an international legal instrument.

111. The final document should contain firm and solemn commitments to the achievement of the aforementioned measures, and should reflect the importance of attaining the goal of universality. The use of nuclear weapons must be forever outlawed.

The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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MAIN COMMITTEE I

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 21 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

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(i) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3

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The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII, PARAGRAPH 3

(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

(i) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3

1. The CHAIRMAN said that he trusted that the evaluation which the Committee was beginning of the implementation of articles I and II and of the first three preambular paragraphs of the Treaty would meet the expectations of States parties and of the entire international community.

2. Mr. AL-HAJAYA (Jordan) said that the commitments in respect of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, undertaken in accordance with the articles and paragraphs under consideration, had been fulfilled to a reasonable extent, although with a few exceptions where the responsibility was not only that of the States exporting nuclear technology and material but also those importing it. When reviewing articles I and II it should be remembered that the Treaty would not attain its objectives unless it was truly universal; it was not only certain States which violated the provisions of the Treaty that should be condemned but also those States which stubbornly refused to accede to it; steps should be taken to encourage States to accede to the Treaty, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could refuse to assist States which were not parties; in order to achieve the objective of the safeguards provided for in Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) and in the statements by the nuclear-weapon States it would be necessary to establish unconditional security assurances, both positive and negative; finally, given that the Treaty had no implementing mechanism, but depended for that on IAEA and the Security Council, those organs should be supported without using any double standard.

3. As for the commitments undertaken by States pursuant to article VI and the preambular paragraphs 8 to 12, the arms race had been brought to a halt at the level of the two super-Powers, but not at the regional level; nuclear disarmament had also progressed as far as the two super-Powers were concerned, but much still remained to be done before it was complete; although the consultations regarding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would be an important step forward towards nuclear disarmament, it should not be considered final since he hoped it would be followed by another treaty that would prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

4. Jordan considered that the middle East was in a special position and that it should therefore be given priority during the consideration of the various issues. Only one State with nuclear capacity in the region continued to refuse to accede to the Treaty and to submit its installations to international inspection. That situation could not continue, particularly in view of the detente that had resulted from the peace process in the region.

5. Mrs. MULAMULA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that her country's decision to accede to the Treaty had been influenced by the positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament following the end of the cold war; it had also been a gesture of goodwill following South Africa's decision to forgo its nuclear ambitions.

6. Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 were the salient features of the Treaty which had been more violated than they had been respected in the 25 years of the Treaty's existence. The international community had witnessed them being violated by those same countries which had signed the Treaty. The United Republic of Tanzania had fulfilled the obligations it had contracted under the Treaty and was participating actively in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. She hoped for an early conclusion of negotiations on a new treaty that would ban all nuclear tests and she expressed the hope that the Conference would come up with a programme of action and a definite timetable for the achievement of nuclear disarmament in the very near future.

7. The CHAIRMAN read out the text of article I of the Treaty and said that he would like to hear from the nuclear-weapon States regarding the implementation of the obligations contracted under that article.

8. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) said that the five nuclear-weapon States fully supported the principle and objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty had given all States the assurance that neighbouring States were not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. It should be pointed out that article I had been literally implemented from the time the Treaty had come into force, and that the best way of ensuring that it continued to be implemented was to support the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

9. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that, as was clear from the statements made by his delegation, both in plenary and in the Committee, and in the national report submitted to the Conference, China's commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons dated not from 1972 when China acceded to the Treaty but from long before, from the very first day it had had such weapons. China had complied strictly with its obligations; it had not assisted, encouraged or induced other States to develop nuclear weapons and it had supported the ban on nuclear tests, the destruction of nuclear weapons and the prohibition and destruction of chemical and biological weapons. China had complied not only with its obligations under article I but also those under article VI.

10. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that, as was pointed out in the documents submitted by his country and in the statement made to the Conference, both the former Soviet Union and the current Russian Federation had complied with article I of the Treaty. The Russian Federation trusted that the Conference would concur with that conclusion and that that would be reflected in the report. It also believed that it was necessary to strengthen the Treaty, particularly the provisions of articles I and II; in order to do so it would be best if the Conference were to decide on an indefinite extension of the Treaty.

11. Mr. BESANCEMOT (France) said that France had fully complied with the commitments stemming from article I of the Treaty.

12. Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom) said that the position of the United Kingdom was clear and had been set forth in detail in the document submitted by his country. The United Kingdom took its obligations under article I of the Treaty very seriously and it endeavoured to fulfil them fully at all times.

13. The CHAIRMAN asked whether any non-nuclear-weapon State wished to confirm what the previous speakers had said.

14. Mr. MARÍN BOSCH (Mexico) said he would like to clarify some matters relating to articles I and II of the Treaty, in particular the question of the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Mexico had no privileged information on the question, but rather depended on the information provided by institutions of various kinds, for instance the report of the non-governmental organization Greenpeace entitled "A special relationship: US/UK nuclear cooperation and the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty" of April 1995, which dealt with nuclear cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom and with the continuing failure to comply with the spirit and objectives of the Treaty. According to that report, over the past 36 years the United States had transferred to the United Kingdom copious quantities of technical information, materials and basic components for the United Kingdom nuclear weapons programme, thus contributing directly to the failure of that country to comply with article VI of the Treaty. The report also cited a statement by the Director of the Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Establishment concerning the nuclear assistance provided by the United States to the United Kingdom Trident programme.

15. He also referred to a document prepared by the Centre for European Security and Disarmament and the British American Security Information Council entitled "NATO and nuclear proliferation", in which it was stated that, although the number of nuclear weapons allocated to the allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been dramatically reduced since the end of the cold war, there were still a number of NATO countries which had nuclear units and held United States nuclear bombs for use in the event of war. The exact number of those weapons was not known, but it was probable that the weapons were a small part of the more than 300 B-61 bombs available to the United States Air Force Europe (USAFE) and that it appeared were being held at nuclear bases in Turkey, Greece, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. The weapons were in the charge of USAFE, which maintained them in order to comply with the rule in the Treaty regarding the transfer of nuclear weapons or devices. However, when the time came to use them, United States nuclear weapons would be loaded onto NATO aircraft flown by allied pilots, so that, when the aircraft took off, the control of those weapons would be transferred to the other State. In view of all the foregoing, he would like clarification regarding the situations mentioned during the course of the debate in order to have a clearer idea of the meaning and scope of the Treaty.

16. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) said he thought that article I was clear in that it specified that nuclear weapons or devices could not be transferred to any recipient, but that it was quite vague with regard to the concepts and

principles which it embodied. Referring to the ideas expressed at previous Conferences concerning the undertakings given by the nuclear-weapon States, he said he wished to raise two questions: first, the deep concern over the nuclear-weapon programmes of some States which were not parties to the Treaty and, second, the specific case of Israel, which was a matter of concern for the whole Middle East region.

17. He pointed out that an appeal had already been made to all States to prohibit any transfer of nuclear facilities, resources or devices and to prohibit the transfer of material destined for the nuclear industry since that would only serve to strengthen the nuclear capacity of the country concerned and be detrimental to the main objective of the Treaty and to international peace and security.

18. Mr. SUKAYRI (Jordan) said that his country had complied with its obligations under article I as a non-nuclear-weapon State. For their part, the nuclear-weapon States had complied with their obligations in principle or in general. However, if those States had complied with the provisions of article I and all other States with a nuclear capability had complied with all their obligations, he wondered how those States which had contravened the provisions of the Treaty had managed to do so since two parties were involved in any transfer of nuclear material: a provider and a recipient. It was therefore not clear where the recipient countries had obtained the nuclear material, technical know-how and technology.

19. Mr. ELTINAI (Sudan) agreed with the view expressed by Jordan concerning the transfer of nuclear weapons or devices and the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States in connection with article I. The States parties to the Treaty, both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, had complied with their obligations under articles I and II. There were, however, also States which were not parties to the Treaty and had a nuclear capability. It appeared, therefore, that the States which had contravened the provisions of the Treaty were those which were not parties to it. The detention of spies in the Sudan had provided information on the way in which States non-parties to the Treaty had managed to transfer nuclear capacity to Israel. Lastly, he pointed out that China was following the same procedure as during the cold war with regard to the transfer of nuclear material; it therefore had some doubts about China's compliance with article I of the Treaty.

20. Mrs. GUELLIL (Germany), responding to the explicit allusion made by the representative of Mexico to the effect that Germany had received nuclear weapons, said that there was no foundation for such a statement. The NATO agreements complied strictly with the provisions of the Treaty. There had never been any transfer whatsoever of nuclear material or know-how for military purpose and at no Conference of the parties had there ever been any complaint that those agreements contravened articles I and II of the Treaty. With regard to the question raised by Jordan, she added that, while there might be reason to believe that nuclear material and know-how had been transferred for military purposes, such accusations must be backed by specific data.

21. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) supported the statement made by the representative of Germany and said he believed that the question raised had nothing to do with the Treaty, in particular article I, since it involved no transfer nor any contribution to the nuclear capacity of non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty. The NATO agreements were therefore compatible with the provisions of the Treaty.

22. Mr. MERNIER (Belgium) endorsed the statements made by the representatives of Germany and Greece. Belgium had never received any military nuclear technology nor had it contravened the provisions of the Treaty in that respect. With regard to article II, he dismissed the accusations made by Greenpeace, which he considered unfounded, since Belgium had never tried to acquire nuclear weapons or to transfer nuclear technology to other countries.

23. Mrs. MULAMULA (United Republic of Tanzania) supported the statements made by the representatives of Mexico, Egypt and Jordan. She also referred to the nuclear nightmare experienced by Africa for years because of the decision of the nuclear-weapon States not to comply with the Treaty. A situation had thus been created in which an African State had acquired a nuclear capability and the countries which had had the means and capacity to verify the relevant reports doubted the accusations of the African countries, which could not themselves verify the truth of the reports. Fortunately, international pressure had obliged that State to acknowledge publicly not only that it had acquired a nuclear capability but also that it had installed nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States had assisted, encouraged and induced some countries to acquire nuclear weapons for one reason or another. Therefore, whatever they might say to the contrary, they had contravened the provisions of article I; it was not, however, up to the non-nuclear-weapon States to prove it.

24. She supported the statement by the representative of Egypt concerning the vagueness of article I, since the deployment of nuclear warheads in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States would represent a violation of article I if it was interpreted as a transfer of nuclear weapons. Lastly, she proposed that a sanctions regime should be imposed on those States which contravened the aforementioned articles; to date the recipient countries had been punished, but the providers should also be penalized.

25. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said that the Philippines had scrupulously complied with the provisions of article II. With regard to article I, the nuclear-weapon States stated that they had fully complied with its provisions; nevertheless, as the representative of Mexico had pointed out, to judge from a Greenpeace report, there had been transfers of nuclear devices from nuclear-weapon States. If that report was true, the Philippines urged the parties concerned to clarify the matter.

26. Mr. SUKAYRI (Jordan) said that a stop had recently been put to the suspected nuclear programme of a State that could not have made progress in that field without receiving transfers of nuclear technology and materials. Jordan would like those participating in such transfers to provide clarifications concerning their methods. The necessary materials or technology could only have come from some of the five nuclear-weapon States.

27. Mr. FASEHUN (Nigeria) said that the wording of article I was precise and unequivocal and not subject to flexible interpretations. The nuclear-weapon States denied that there had been any transfers. Nigeria wondered if any transfers of nuclear material or technology from those States had taken place. According to the Greenpeace report mentioned by Mexico, the transfers were an established fact. There was no denying the importance of those charges. The present Conference differed from earlier conferences because of the decisions that were to be adopted. If there had been any negligence or violations of the Treaty the States involved must admit the fact.

28. He thought that too much emphasis had been placed on horizontal proliferation, whereas vertical proliferation was an equally disturbing problem. Like other countries, Nigeria wondered how some States had acquired the technology and resources necessary to be practically in a position to develop nuclear weapons, and what effect the transfer of such resources and technology would have on the development of those States. It also wondered if it was true that a non-nuclear-weapon State allied with a nuclear-weapon State could, in case of war, have access to such weapons.

29. Lastly, he said that, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria had stated, Nigeria's policy in the matter of nuclear weapons had always been absolutely transparent. Nigeria was receiving no nuclear products or devices that were not subject to IAEA safeguards, and it did not permit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nigeria would like all States present to make a similar statement.

30. Mr. KERVERS (Netherlands) said that the Netherlands had fully observed the provisions of article II. With regard to the publication mentioned by the representative of Mexico on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and proliferation, like the representatives of Germany, Greece and Belgium, he wished to state that the Netherlands had never acquired control over nuclear weapons. NATO had always been governed by the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty.

31. On the other hand, his delegation did not agree with the view that a violation of article II necessarily implied a violation of article I; the non-nuclear weapon States had their own responsibilities under article II and there could be a violation of that article without any participation by nuclear-weapon States.

32. Mr. MAJID (Bangladesh) said that article I referred only to nuclear-weapon States and did not prevent States that have no nuclear weapons but were technologically advanced from doing precisely what the article prohibited. Those States could not transfer nuclear weapons but they could assist, encourage or induce non-nuclear weapon States to manufacture or acquire them, especially if they were not parties to the Treaty. Bangladesh would like to have clarifications on that point.

33. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that it was possible that exports of nuclear material made in good faith and for peaceful purposes were being diverted to nuclear weapons programmes. There had been at least two cases of States parties violating the provisions of the Treaty in that way.

34. Mr. EFFENDI (Indonesia) said that his country was not in a position to verify compliance with the provisions of articles I and II. Like the representative of Mexico, he recalled Greenpeace reports to the effect that the provisions of articles I and II had been violated by nuclear-weapon States. If the Treaty was to be strengthened, every effort must be made to comply with its provisions. In that connection Indonesia would like it to be established whether the accusations of violations were true or false.

35. Mr. FOUATHIA (Algeria) said that his country was also incapable of verifying compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. Shortly after the first nuclear test on the African continent, which had taken place in Algeria, the majority of African countries had become aware of the need to declare Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa had been approved by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1964. However, it had not been possible to put the Declaration into effect because of the nuclear ambitions harboured at that time by one State on the continent. The fears of the African countries had proved to be well founded when South Africa had confirmed that it had a nuclear programme. Fortunately those ambitions had been renounced and, at the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, the final text of a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa could be submitted.

36. With regard to the Middle East, it was stated that there had been no transfers of nuclear weapons or devices. But, once again, the reverse could be deduced from the fact that one State, which was not a party to the Treaty, had not placed its installations under IAEA safeguards and had not denied that it possessed nuclear weapons. Algeria felt that in that case, too, fears were not unfounded. It would like its concern to be reflected in the report of the Conference.

37. Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom) wished to refer to the comments made by the representative of Mexico concerning nuclear cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom, and particularly to the comment that the transfer of nuclear material and other information constituted a violation of the spirit of articles I and VI of the Treaty. The United States and the United Kingdom had made no transfers prohibited by article I. He also pointed out that the United Kingdom was strictly abiding by its obligations under article VI. As had been said in the general debate, the United Kingdom had made a considerable contribution to the reduction of nuclear forces and, by the end of the 1990s, it would have reduced its nuclear warheads by 21 per cent compared to the 1970s level, which showed its commitment to promoting the objectives stated in article VI.

38. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) said that the mutual defence agreements with the United Kingdom and the relevant NATO provisions were fully in accord with article I of the Treaty. Despite statements to the contrary, the United States had not transferred any nuclear weapons, nor had it encouraged or induced any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire explosive nuclear devices. United States legislation explicitly prohibited such activities, both in the public and in the private sectors. Moreover, a comprehensive system for the control of nuclear technology and dual-use exports had been set up with a view to ensuring compliance with the provisions of article I of the Treaty.

39. With regard to article II, he wished to draw attention to the various reports prepared by the IAEA and the Special United Nations Commission on inspections in Iraq under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). The obvious conclusion to be drawn from those documents was that Iraq had violated the provisions of article II of the Treaty. The United States felt that the same attention should be paid to article II as to article I.

40. The CHAIRMAN said that a question of sovereign political will was involved. If a State committed a deliberate violation and did not wish to explain the reasons for its action, the only possibility left was to seek information from another State. If confidence was placed in the abilities of the press or non-governmental organizations it was because, since they were not interested parties, they were assumed to provide, independently of the results of their inquiries, a reliable and unbiased view which had a certain credibility. On the other hand he expressed the hope that the recommendations resulting from the Committee's proceedings would serve to remedy the deficiencies noted in the application of the Treaty.

41. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) said that the measures taken to monitor the export of nuclear materials, in which his country was also participating, had been strengthened in recent years, and that showed the solidarity that existed between the exporting countries and contributed to the strengthening of the non-proliferation system by the nuclear-weapon States and helped to promote faith in the Treaty.

42. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that he had the same questions as the representative of Mexico and other members of the Committee regarding violations of article I of the Treaty by nuclear-weapon States. In fact, those States had failed to provide any clear explanation of such violations, examples of which included the agreements between the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the sale of Polaris and Trident missiles for the development of nuclear weapons systems, the supply of radioactive nitric acid to the B205 facility at Sellafield, United Kingdom, and the promises made between nuclear-weapon States to transfer information and technology relating to nuclear test simulations.

43. Mr. JURSCHEWSKY (Canada), referring to article I, said that the presumed programmes for the manufacture of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had led some delegations to conclude that improper transfers of technology had taken place. His delegation did not share that view. Unfortunately, the manufacture of nuclear weapons was based on a highly developed technology the principles of which were widely known and not confined to the nuclear-weapon States. It was even possible to find information on the design of nuclear bombs through networks such as INTERNET. That depressing fact underscored the need to improve export controls on nuclear technology to ensure that it was used for peaceful purposes and the need to strengthen the implementation of the IAEA safeguards programme. With regard to article II, he noted that since the late 1940s Canada had renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons and roundly affirmed that it had received no nuclear technology whatsoever, and would not accept it under any circumstances.

44. The CHAIRMAN read out article II of the Treaty and said that, by definition, the obligation set out in that article applied to non-nuclear-weapon States parties. He therefore hoped that those States would say whether they had respected the provisions of that article.

45. Mr. MERNIER (Belgium) agreed with the representative of Canada that a violation of the Treaty did not necessarily require two guilty parties; many of the States taking part in the debate had the capacity to develop nuclear weapons without resorting to the technology of nuclear-weapon States. Article II dealt with cases in which States manufactured nuclear weapons with their own resources. Belgium provided a broad range of cooperation in the sphere of civilian nuclear power. Given that the boundary between the military and civilian nuclear energy sectors was somewhat indistinct, the possibility that civilian nuclear material delivered to one State might be diverted to other uses that violated the Treaty could not be excluded.

46. The CHAIRMAN invited the nuclear-weapon States to express their views as to whether non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had duly met their obligations under that instrument.

47. Mr. KERVERS (Netherlands) said that the responsibility for complying with article II lay with States that did not possess nuclear weapons and not on those that did. In his view, it was not up to the latter to determine whether the former had violated the provisions of the Treaty.

48. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) supported the remarks made by the representative of the Netherlands and said that, with regard to the failure to comply with the provisions of article II, statements had been issued not only by one nuclear-weapon State but by the Security Council itself, including those having to do with Iraq's failure to comply with those provisions and Security Council resolution 815 (1993), which called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abide by the agreement concluded with IAEA under the Treaty.

49. Mr. LAPTSENAK (Belarus) said that although his country had not participated in the drafting of the non-proliferation Treaty, it had become a party to the Treaty without reservations and was fully complying with its provisions. Belarus was an example of the way in which a State party to the Treaty could fulfil its obligations, since on acceding to that instrument it had eliminated its tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, and its current Constitution expressly stated that the country was a non-nuclear-weapon State.

50. Mr. ELTINAI (Sudan) said that the violation covered in article II was not exactly the same as acquisition; the deployment of nuclear weapons was also a kind of violation. The responsibilities and obligations of recipient States included those arising from a country's acceptance of the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory.

51. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) and Ms. GUELLIL (Germany) said that their countries, which were non-nuclear-weapon States, were complying strictly with the provisions of article II.

52. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said he thought it was quite logical that the Chairman should invite the nuclear-weapon States to make statements on other States' compliance with the provisions of article II, and he wondered whether the representative of the Netherlands had spoken as a nuclear-weapon or a non-nuclear-weapon State. For its part, the Philippines was a non-nuclear-weapon State which complied with the provisions of article II.

53. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that while there were confirmed instances of failure to comply with the provisions of the Treaty, including the outright production of nuclear technology, in other cases, such as that of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, failure to comply had not been conclusively demonstrated. His delegation was not aware of any other violations of article II.

54. Mr. HASAN (Iraq) said that he would not go into detail regarding the false accusations that had been levelled against his country which were a cover-up for well-known political interests. He wished to stress, however, that the attitude of the Security Council vis-à-vis Iraq was discriminatory, not objective and did not serve to strengthen the Treaty. There were States other than the five nuclear Powers that had produced nuclear bombs and still others that were trying to learn more about manufacturing such weapons, producing enriched uranium and using plutonium radiation. In addition, some States that were not parties to the Treaty had transferred large amounts of uranium to other States that were also not parties. In that context, Iraq should be cleared of all such accusations, and his delegation intended to take the matter up more fully at a subsequent meeting of the Committee.

55. The CHAIRMAN said it seemed to be the view of the Committee that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had largely met their obligations under article II.

56. Mr. GAJDA (Hungary) said that the Committee's review should lead to a serious report based on statements and facts. The Committee had a mandate to conduct a review but not to judge. The regime set up by Governments had a mechanism for investigating complaints, a task which fell to IAEA and, subsequently, to the Security Council. The Committee must not seek to do the work of those two bodies, although every country had the right to state its position. The Government of Hungary was complying fully with the provisions of article II and had not been asked or forced to become a nuclear-weapon State.

57. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee had concluded its debate on article II. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed with the content of the first three paragraphs of the preamble. He asked delegations to submit concrete proposals on articles I and II, which would be systematized by the Secretariat for subsequent consideration by the Committee. The draft document would be approved by the Committee prior to submission to the drafting committee.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/SR.4
4 May 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

MAIN COMMITTEE I

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 25 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

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REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII, PARAGRAPH 3

(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

(i) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3 (continued)

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Any corrections to the records of this meeting and of other meetings of the Conference will be consolidated in a single corrigendum, to be issued shortly after the end of the Conference.

95-80832 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.45 p.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII, PARAGRAPH 3

(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

(i) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3 (continued) (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.2, CRP.3, CRP.4, CRP.5 and CRP.6)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that review of the question of security assurances and article VII had been entrusted to a working group, whereas the Committee itself would focus on articles I and II of the Treaty and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 on the basis of the working papers.

2. Mr. ALHAJIBRAHIM (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his country had been one of the first to accede to the Treaty. For 25 years Syria had complied with its commitments under the Treaty, had never attempted to acquire nuclear weapons, and had played a positive role in strengthening security and stability in the Middle East. The Conference offered a unique and historic opportunity to eliminate nuclear weapons and the risk that their proliferation represented for the world. The Conference would facilitate objective study of the articles of the Treaty and the establishment of binding legal rules to ensure that States fulfilled the obligations set forth in the preamble and articles I and II of the Treaty.

3. The objective and general sense of the provisions of articles I and II were quite clear. The possession of nuclear weapons, and of materials which could be used to develop nuclear weapons by States, in particular States which were not parties to the Treaty, would not have been possible without the assistance of nuclear-weapon States which did not respect their obligations under those articles.

4. The refusal of Israel, the only State in the sensitive region of the Middle East to possess nuclear weapons, to accede to the Treaty deprived the latter of universality. In acting as it did Israel enjoyed an unfair advantage enabling it to strengthen its nuclear arsenal with which it threatened peace and security in the Middle East and throughout the world. At the same time there were demands for other States in the region, parties to the Treaty, to conform to its provisions. By refusing to place its installations under the system of safeguards, Israel left the door open for an arms race in the region. Israel should follow the example of other nuclear-weapon States which had renounced the nuclear option by acceding to the Treaty, on which they were to be commended.

5. At the conference on chemical weapons, held in Paris in 1989, Syria had made an appeal for the establishment in the Middle East, under United Nations auspices, of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. However it was impossible to establish such a zone if at the heart of the Middle East there

particular the heading relating to export licensing. That heading could cause confusion, because in recent years there had been a tendency to refer rather to export control regimes; for greater clarity, it would be preferable to continue using the same term. The reference under point 8 to the complementary and important role of national export mechanisms was too vague and should be amended by including the words "multilaterally agreed, transparent guidelines to supplement safeguards". Lastly, he did not quite understand what the term "lists" in the fifth line in point 8 referred to.

5. Mr. ROSU (Romania), supported by Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said the time had come to formulate specific proposals instead of lingering over a pointless debate on the heading in the Chairman's proposal which, in the last analysis, was only a tool intended to help guide the discussion.

Working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.1

6. Ms. ALANI (Sweden), introducing document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.1 on behalf of the authors (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden), recalled that they had met regularly during the 1980 Review Conference to prepare their own proposals for texts to be included in the final report as well as to study the texts prepared by other countries. Since they had started to work together, those States had called for the application of full-scope safeguards as a condition for nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty.

7. Extensive texts to be used in the work of Main Committee II had been prepared for the 1985 and 1990 Review Conferences. Those texts, which had been widely accepted, had formed the basis for the 1985 Final Document and the report of Main Committee II at the 1990 Review Conference. In preparing texts on articles III and IV for the 1995 Review Conference, the 11 authors of the document under consideration had met a number of times in Vienna to discuss developments since 1990 and had adjusted the agreed texts accordingly, taking into account also the comments made by other countries in a consultation process. The texts had been prepared as working papers and would be available to all delegations. Document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.1 was based to a large extent on the text submitted in 1990. The first paragraph had been adjusted slightly in comparison to the 1990 text, but it covered the same substance, i.e., the generally positive assessments of the implementation of article III produced by earlier conferences. The text as a whole had been updated to include developments during the past five years and contained a reference to the Security Council and the statement made by its President in January 1992, reinforcing the message that nuclear proliferation was a major threat to international peace and security. She hoped that the text would facilitate the work of Main Committee II and would help it to agree on a final text.

Working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10

8. Mr. WAN JUN (China), introducing document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10, said it was based on statements made by his delegation in the plenary and in the Committee and took into account comments by other delegations. The text was very clear and needed no explanation. It related mainly to point 1 in document

NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/CRP.2 ("Introduction") except for part III, entitled "Nuclear-weapons-free zones" which referred to a question mentioned in point 9.

9. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.2 was notable for being well thought out, very useful, and a good introduction to consideration of the implementation of article III. It should not be controversial for it was drafted clearly and completely neutral in that it dealt solely with undisputed facts.

10. On the other hand, that document, although in itself completely acceptable, did not seem relevant to the point under consideration, at least as far as part I was concerned. The part concerning safeguards seemed to be more relevant, but his delegation had only just received the document and would like to study it more thoroughly. It would perhaps be helpful if the Chinese delegation were to give a detailed explanation concerning each of the issues dealt with during the point-by-point discussion of the Chairman's proposal.

11. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that, while to a large extent he subscribed to the remarks made by the representative of Italy, he wished to state that the working paper submitted by China seemed to provide an excellent basis which should be taken into account in the drafting of the Committee's report. Having said that, it was important to determine where in the working paper some of its elements should be included; he wondered, for example, whether the link established in part I, paragraph 2, between nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy really belonged in an introduction to article III. On the other hand, while some of the elements dealt with in part II, entitled "Nuclear safeguards", merited inclusion in the introduction, other, more specific, elements would benefit from further consideration at a later stage of the discussions.

12. The CHAIRMAN invited interested delegations to meet to find a text acceptable to all so that at a later stage of its deliberations the Committee would have a better structured basis for discussion. To that end, he urged those delegations which had submitted working papers NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.1, 2 and 10 to submit specific proposals and to try to find a common language.

Working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.2

13. Mr. MACKINNON (Canada), introducing working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.2 on behalf of the authors (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden), said that the starting point of the text was the conviction that IAEA safeguards provided assurance that States were complying with their undertakings and helped them to demonstrate that compliance. Safeguards thus played a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in the strengthening of collective security.

14. The working paper dealt extensively with the problem of non-compliance with undertakings, which undermined the significance of the Treaty. Continued efforts must be made to give the Treaty a universal character. The States which had submitted the working paper attached great importance to the strengthening of safeguards, which would have to evolve if they were to become integral

components of national security interests in an increasingly nuclear-free world. IAEA had done much in that regard and, by reiterating that the main purpose of comprehensive safeguards agreements was to verify that nuclear materials were not diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the Board of Governors of IAEA had taken an important step towards strengthening safeguards. The safeguards system should therefore be designed to provide for verification of the correctness and completeness of the declarations made by States.

15. Programme 93 + 2 had many complex components which would need to be carefully examined. The Conference could play an important role in that regard by ensuring recognition of the importance for the signatories to the Treaty of the continuing improvement of the safeguards system. The working paper situated safeguards in the broader context of ensuring compliance with and enforcement of obligations under the Treaty. He noted the responsibility of all parties to the Treaty and of the Security Council and emphasized the need for transparency in national nuclear policies and programmes.

16. Mr. WANG JUN (China), referring to part II of the working paper which he had just introduced (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10), said that the IAEA safeguards system had two objectives: to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There was unanimity among the participants in the Conference regarding the prevention of proliferation and the strengthening of safeguards. The safeguards system was specifically mentioned in the preamble and in article III, paragraph 3, of the non-proliferation Treaty, but the Treaty specified that the system should in no way hamper the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation emphasized that point in the working paper it had submitted.

17. As to how to strengthen the safeguards system, his delegation believed that the question should be considered by the competent international bodies, but that due account should also be taken of the financial and legal implications. Only negotiations could lead to progress on those questions, which were not new since they had already been raised within the framework of IAEA. In paragraph 4 of its working paper, his delegation had indicated the principles to be followed to strengthen the safeguards system and it believed that those elements should be taken into consideration in the Committee's report.

18. Mr. ADEKEYE (Nigeria) said that he had carefully studied the two working papers and had found them very useful. He noted, however, that some very important elements were missing in working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.2. With regard to working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10, he drew attention, in particular, to the balance to be established between safeguards and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy (para. 5) and to the principles to be observed in strengthening the safeguards system (para. 7). Those questions, which were of great importance to his delegation, should be dealt with in the part of the final document relating to article III.

19. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium), referring to working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10, submitted by China, observed that, in paragraph 5, it would be preferable to use a more positive formulation such as "the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation promotes peaceful uses ..." instead of the phrase "the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation should be beneficial for the promotion of

peaceful uses ...". In the last sentence of paragraph 6, the word "agreements" in the plural was used. At the meeting of the Board of Governors in March, the consensus had been that, if there were other agreements, a model agreement should be adopted, not different agreements. Belgium would not wish to see the establishment of an "à la carte" safeguards system and hoped that the Chinese delegation would agree to use the term "model agreement", for example, in its formulation. Work had been done on the basis of a universal system of safeguards and it was important to ensure that a new system was not established which was no longer universal.

20. With regard to paragraph 7, his delegation agreed with the principles set out therein. However, it had had long experience of safeguards and knew that their application required a certain effort on the part of the State which was subject to them. For its part, it was prepared to make that effort and hoped that all States would be prepared to do the same. The Chinese proposal should therefore be qualified and should clearly indicate that all States should make an effort, in some cases a financial effort.

21. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said he saw nothing in part II of working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10, submitted by China, which could give rise to objections, except that the text appeared to be too circumspect. That had certainly not been the intention of its author. That there was a need to strengthen safeguards was quite evident and many speakers had not failed to mention it in the plenary Conference. The fear that safeguards might hamper the promotion of peaceful uses was hardly justified. Italy attached great importance to the question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had even feared, at the time of signing the Treaty, that safeguards might put non-nuclear-weapon States at a disadvantage in relation to nuclear-weapon States. It had ceased all nuclear activities, even for peaceful purposes, but its experience, although not as long as that of Belgium, had shown it that safeguards also had a price for States which accepted them and that they had never hampered activities relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To say that safeguards should not prevent countries from using nuclear energy might lead to confusion.

22. With regard to the mention of measures beyond the existing legal framework (para. 6), it was evident that any measure which was beyond that framework should be the subject of negotiations, even if that involved only a few of the measures set out in IAEA Programme 93 + 2. Assuming that there were such measures, however, insistence on that point would give the impression that in reality the Conference was extremely circumspect on the question of strengthening safeguards, whereas in fact it very much wanted to strengthen them.

23. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) supported the representative of Belgium and agreed that the Chinese document contained a number of elements which might be incorporated in the final document. However, regarding the strengthening of guarantees, the concept must first of all be understood and a degree of flexibility demonstrated so as not to give the impression that it was the intent of the Conference to pre-empt a flexible approach by referring to the legal aspects before it was even determined what the concept of strengthening involved. The legal aspects were certainly important, but should come into play

later. In making a statement on the future activities of IAEA, a clear indication must be given that the Conference supported the work of the Agency aimed at formulating the concept of strengthening. The legal provisions that that commonly shared concept would entail would then become a secondary issue.

24. Ms. KUROKOCHI (Japan) said that as a result of the increase in nuclear activities throughout the world, as well as the financial constraints experienced by IAEA, the question of the strengthening of the effectiveness of the system of safeguards, broached in particular in the working paper submitted by China, was of great interest to her delegation, which wished to play an active part in the drafting of the text on the question.

25. Ms. DELPECH (France) said that it was important to emphasize that non-proliferation commitments and IAEA safeguards played an essential role in the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, since they constituted a proper framework for nuclear trade for peaceful purposes and nuclear technical cooperation. With regard to the strengthening of safeguards, the work of the Committee was awaited with some expectation since the strengthening of controls was at a particularly important stage. While it was true that the main aim of comprehensive safeguards agreements was to verify that materials under safeguards were not diverted for the production of nuclear weapons, it should be emphasized that such agreements and the IAEA statute provided the necessary authority to take appropriate measures to detect potentially undeclared nuclear activities - an essential consideration after the experience of the Iraqi programme. The strengthening of safeguards should, above all else, enable the Agency and member States to strengthen their assurances in that regard, and also constituted an essential element in the collective security to which the Treaty contributed.

26. Mr. NORENDAL (Norway), referring to the working paper submitted by China (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10), said that the approach taken was not fully satisfactory, since it entailed mention in the Committee report of a debate long pursued at IAEA, namely the balance to be struck between safeguards and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The manner in which the question of safeguards was included with other elements was also unsatisfactory. His delegation would vastly prefer a statement to be made in support of the strengthening of assurances without mentioning conditions, as the Chinese paper did.

27. Mr. HOFFMAN (Germany), referring to document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.2, said that, in view of developments since the 1990 Review Conference, IAEA safeguards should not only seek to provide assurances that nuclear materials would not be diverted from declared facilities but should also be strengthened to ensure that no undeclared nuclear activities were being carried out. To that end there was a need for full transparency with respect to national nuclear policies and programmes, ensured by States parties, and enhanced detection capabilities on the part of the Agency. Germany thus called upon all the parties to the Treaty to implement the measures approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency aimed at improving its ability to detect the existence of undeclared nuclear activities in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and obtain access to the related installations. Germany strongly endorsed the thrust of the programmes currently being pursued by the Agency and called on all States

parties to do likewise. His delegation expected firmer assurances regarding the absence of undeclared activities to provide a basis for reducing costs in implementing safeguards relating to declared materials.

28. As for the working paper submitted by China (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10), his delegation had no specific objection to the language contained in part I, but anticipated that it might prove controversial as far as some other delegations were concerned. Germany would prefer to emphasize that non-proliferation commitments, good faith compliance and full scope safeguards constituted the necessary framework for "enhanced cooperation between countries on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy".

29. In part II, his delegation suggested the replacement of the words "IAEA safeguards have become ..." by "IAEA safeguards are ...", since the Agency's safeguards had from the outset been an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime. Germany did not propose to discuss, in the context of the Conference, the objectives of IAEA, which was an independent international organization whose objectives fell within the purview of its own organs. On the other hand the Conference might discuss the goals of the Treaty, or the adequate execution by IAEA of the tasks conferred upon it by the Treaty and by States parties. If safeguards and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were discussed in that context, it should be made clear that non-proliferation commitments, in particular full scope safeguards required under the Treaty from non-nuclear-weapon States, constituted the necessary framework for international cooperation. Non-proliferation and safeguards were not only two goals in parallel to peaceful nuclear cooperation, but were the conditions upon which such cooperation depended.

30. Furthermore, the principles emphasized in the paragraph under consideration already constituted the basis for the Agency's activities under the Treaty, whereas the wording gave the impression that IAEA and its system of safeguards did not respect those principles and that the Agency needed to be exhorted to return to them. His delegation would like to avoid giving such an impression.

31. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, his delegation thought that it would be preferable not to repeat the contents of Protocols II and III of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and, to avoid possible difficulties which some members of the Committee might have with the last sentence of the paragraph, it would be advisable to use less strong language than "urge".

32. Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that the question of IAEA safeguards was extremely important, as evidenced by the attention which various delegations had given to it. The two working papers before the Committee were extremely different, but the substance of both were acceptable to his delegation, which would nevertheless like to propose a few amendments. Furthermore, if a working group was to be established to draft the Committee's final document, his delegation wished to be a member of it.

33. Mr. DE ICAZA (Mexico) said that, on the question of safeguards, the two working papers complemented rather than countered each other.

34. His delegation supported the 93 + 2 programme and understood that the IAEA Board of Governors had adopted the general approach but had not yet agreed on specific measures. It was therefore vital to determine first, among the measures proposed to strengthen the safeguards system, those which were part of the existing legal framework and those which went beyond it. It was also important to emphasize that, to be able to apply measures which went beyond the existing agreements, an appropriate legal framework would have to be established, negotiated and approved, not only by the Board of Governors, but by all the States parties to the Treaty, the objective being to make the framework binding, universal and non-discriminatory and to avoid establishing a layering of different types of agreements in force as a result of the NPT. In that regard, his delegation supported the Belgian proposal to avoid the plural use of the word "agreement". On the contrary, what was necessary was to strengthen the idea of a standard agreement to which all States would be called upon to subscribe. It had submitted to the plenary Conference a working paper on the question (NPT/CONF.1995/23), containing elements that the Committee might wish to retain. Section 4, for example, referred the importance of strengthening the current IAEA safeguards system on the basis of the proposal by the Director General, in the light of the comments made by various States in the Board of Governors and on the basis of agreements clearly stating the powers of IAEA and the obligations of States.

35. His delegation would also like to take part in the work of any drafting group asked to prepare the text of the paragraphs relating to those questions.

36. Mr. DE LA TORRE (Argentina) said that working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.2 accurately reflected new developments since the last Review Conference. The question of safeguards was one of the most important which had been considered in recent years, not only in IAEA but also at the level of the Security Council and the international community as a whole. The working paper's approach was realistic in that it emphasized the international community's immense interest in the current process. To overlook those new developments would have a negative impact on the Conference's evaluation of the safeguards system at a time when the international community was on the threshold of a consensus designed to strengthen the system. If, instead of focusing on those questions, the Conference dealt with more general ideas, its proceedings would be deprived of much of their substance and would therefore lose some of their precision and political commitment.

37. Mr. CHUN (Republic of Korea) said that the ideas in document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10, especially part II, were entirely reasonable and needed no change except that the references to legal, financial and technical questions in the 93 + 2 programme could impair the political support the programme currently received. China's observations, especially with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, should perhaps be presented differently.

38. Mr. RAZLEY (Malaysia) said that he too favoured the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, whose effectiveness and viability needed to be enhanced. However, the Agency's current efforts in that regard should be taken into consideration. Accordingly, when the final document was drafted, care should be taken to reflect the formulation used in the agreements which States had signed with IAEA.

39. Mr. PAPDIMITROPOULOS (Greece) fully supported document WP.2. In document WP.10, the last sentence of paragraph 6, concerning measures which went beyond the existing legal framework, posed a problem: it was still too early for delegations to be able to determine that question, because they did not have the IAEA secretariat document, which would not be submitted until mid-1995. As to the formulation describing the new legal framework, his delegation preferred the wording of document WP.2, which spoke of existing safeguards agreements or complementary authority to be conferred by the States involved. The IAEA Statute and the existing safeguards machinery envisaged in document INF/CIRC/153 would provide the necessary framework of reference for new arrangements.

40. Mr. WALKER (Australia), speaking as a sponsor of documents WP.1 and WP.2, said that they had been established on the basis of the 1990 consensus, which had been updated to reflect events since that date and the consequent need to strengthen the safeguards system, especially with a view to detecting undeclared nuclear activities. Those were new and important elements, and his delegation wished the Committee to discuss them in detail.

41. With respect to document WP.10, he said that the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 and the first part of paragraph 6 dealing with general principles should rather be placed in the introduction of the document devoted to the question of safeguards. The second part of paragraph 6 and paragraph 7, however, were concerned more especially with the strengthening of the safeguards system and, while his delegation did not subscribe to their formulation, it considered that their key idea corresponded to a principle of which the Committee should take cognizance. His delegation intended to introduce, on behalf of the sponsors, a text on comprehensive safeguards.

Working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.6

42. Mr. POSTA (Hungary), introducing working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.6 on behalf of the 11 non-nuclear-weapon countries which had prepared it, said that the effectiveness of the safeguards system depended to a large extent on the professional qualifications of the IAEA inspectors and the conditions in which they worked. The sponsors of the text had therefore noted with satisfaction the IAEA secretariat's efforts to ensure the highest professional standards were maintained as well as having the widest geographical distribution possible. With respect to conditions of work, some States continue to impose restrictions affecting the designation of inspectors. As IAEA stated, only 23 countries were currently applying the simplified procedures proposed by the Director General. Yet, the adoption of those procedures, together with the issue of multiple entry and exit visas or any other arrangement facilitating the activities of the inspectors, would help to establish greater trust and enable IAEA to make better use of its human and material resources. Accordingly, the second paragraph of the text called for increased cooperation by all States. On behalf of the sponsors, he expressed the hope that the document would be approved by all the members of the Committee.

43. Mr. ANDREW (United Kingdom) said that the working papers before the Committee provided an excellent basis for considering the safeguards question. His delegation would submit comments on the subject during the drafting of the final document.

1995 Review and Extension Conference

of the Parties to the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/SR.5
28 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

MAIN COMMITTEE I

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 26 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

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(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:

(ii) ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 12

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Any corrections to the records of this meeting and of other meetings of the Conference will be consolidated in a single corrigendum, to be issued shortly after the end of the Conference.

/...

95-80838 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII, PARAGRAPH 3:

(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:

(ii) ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 12 (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.1, 2 and 3; NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.7)

1. Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland) said that, in his view, article VI, together with articles I and II, constituted the very substance of the Treaty. Although not ideal, it had stood the test of time as a framework for the most determined pursuit of disarmament ever seen. Upholding the Treaty through its indefinite extension might not correct the elements that some perceived to be discriminatory, but, while the world might not become a fairer place as a result, at the least, it would become more secure. The record confirmed that the promise of the Treaty had indeed been pursued in good faith, with results deemed inconceivable at the previous review conference only five years earlier.

2. As the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, he was firmly convinced that the promise set out in the Preamble to "seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time and to continue negotiations to this end" had been pursued by the Conference on Disarmament with dedication, a sense of urgency and positive results. The negotiating process, which had begun only in March 1994, had recorded important progress. Agreement on a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty was imminent, and no effort would be spared to produce a final text before the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. While such sensitive issues as entry into force remained to be resolved, flexibility on the part of the nuclear Powers and of many non-nuclear-weapon States had narrowed and sometimes eliminated divergences and controversies. Of crucial significance were the decision of the United States to drop the proposal for a 10-year special withdrawal provision and the recent agreement by the United Kingdom and France not to include a provision on "tests in exceptional circumstances". An early political decision to establish a four-technology international monitoring system that was complete and reliable was the essential next step.

3. Although some problems remained and the negotiations were complex, the comprehensive test-ban treaty was an indispensable step on the road to achieving the objectives of article VI. Without doubt, each new step would be easier than the previous one, as mutual trust and confidence were built up.

4. Mr. KAYSER (Luxembourg) said that, at the previous meeting, his country had been incorrectly criticized by the representative of Iraq for making an authorized shipment of depleted uranium to Israel. The shipment did not contain enriched uranium, as erroneously stated by Iraq. The difference between the two materials was enormous. Depleted uranium was used for a variety of conventional civilian applications, for example in the hulls of ships or aircraft to increase their stability, and as shielding, because of its high specific density. IAEA had verified that the substance in question had been put to conventional, non-nuclear use. Even the organization Greenpeace had certified that Luxembourg had pursued a policy of nuclear non-proliferation.

5. Mr. TYUTYUNNIK (Ukraine) said that Ukraine, which had voluntarily renounced the possession of its nuclear weapons, was in favour of the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, since it was the only instrument that laid the international legal groundwork for a universal system to eliminate the nuclear threat.

6. In its efforts to implement the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I), Ukraine had been consistent in its nuclear disarmament policy. All tactical nuclear weapons had been transferred from Ukraine to the Russian Federation for dismantling. The transfer and dismantling of strategic nuclear weapons were also proceeding according to schedule. On the whole, Ukraine was satisfied with the agreements reached between the Russian Federation, the United States and Ukraine on compensation to be provided to Ukraine for all the nuclear weapons that it had inherited from the former Soviet Union.

7. Consideration of article VI of the Treaty should be based on the positive trends that had been taking place in nuclear disarmament over the past few years. For the first time since the adoption of the Treaty, the nuclear arsenals of most nuclear-weapon States had been reduced. The number of "threshold" States had grown smaller, as had the number of countries in whose territories nuclear weapons had been deployed. Such trends should be strengthened politically and legally in order to ensure the irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament process.

8. All delegations should make every effort to ensure the indefinite extension of the Treaty and the adoption of the final document of the Conference. The final document should contain the reaffirmation by all nuclear-weapon States of their obligation under article VI of the Treaty to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. It should also take note of the willingness of all States parties to the Treaty to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty by the end of 1995, and of their commitment to making real progress towards the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

9. The CHAIRMAN said that article VI was the linchpin of the Treaty, and that the Committee must be determined to give it content and orientation within a projected framework of a strengthened Treaty. It was for the Committee to determine whether negotiations were being conducted in good faith, to consider the meaning of "at an early date", and what elements constituted nuclear disarmament.

10. Mr. STARR (Australia), focusing on the negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, said that the Polish representative's assessment of those negotiations coincided with that of his own delegation. The final declaration of the Conference should give expression to the consensus resolution calling for intensive negotiations and their prompt conclusion with a view to providing impetus to the process. To that end, his delegation would submit a paper encompassing language which welcomed the historic consensus adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions on the comprehensive test-ban treaty, as well as the recent establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with a mandate to negotiate a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. The significant progress so far achieved in the negotiations, which led him to anticipate their foreseeable conclusion, would also be welcomed. It was vital that the Committee should affirm support for the expeditious and intensive continuation of those negotiations as the highest priority of the Conference on Disarmament, with a view to concluding the text in 1995, being the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, so that it could be signed in 1996 at the latest. Also welcome was the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their particular responsibility in those negotiations, as well as their commitment to continue intensively to negotiate the comprehensive test-ban treaty and their pledge of support for its conclusion. He looked forward to a draft which would provide the required impetus.

11. Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) concluded that the provisions of article VI remained unfulfilled; the phrase "at an early date" could not possibly be construed to mean 25 years later. None the less, serious efforts aimed at compliance had occurred only very recently and were no more than bilateral. Fulfilment of the provisions of article VI therefore required a great deal more work. Such facts should be taken into account in the document which would contain the Committee's assessment concerning the implementation of article VI.

12. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) said that the comprehensive test-ban treaty should prohibit all nuclear tests without distinction as a step towards the full prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. It should therefore ban all preparatory and other activities aimed at encouraging, assisting or providing a suitable environment for carrying out nuclear test explosions, as well as prevent the possible improvement or modernization of nuclear weapons. The ban on nuclear test explosions should include even those carried out under a peaceful guise with a view to ensuring that no military benefit was gained. The verification method should be universally applied on a non-discriminatory basis and should include international monitoring. It should also be technically effective and encompass all forms of verification, whether seismic or non-seismic, as well as on-site inspection. Moreover, an incremental approach should be pursued in order to improve monitoring that permitted maximum benefit to be derived from any technical advances achieved. It was therefore vital that

negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty should be pursued with renewed vigour and firm determination, with 1996 as the clear target date for conclusion.

13. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) affirmed that his delegation, in common with many others, regarded the conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty as merely a first step towards the ultimate goal of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. According to his information, the size of detonations was an item of much debate in the treaty negotiations; a test ban, however, meant the total elimination of detonations. He shared the Australian view that the treaty should be concluded during the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. He looked forward to considering the Australian proposal concerning the language relevant to the issue.

14. Mr. ONANGA (Gabon) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was part of a dynamic process and that positive developments in the negotiations on disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular should be viewed judiciously. Although the post-cold-war climate favoured such developments, they were essentially the result of confidence-building measures implemented among the nuclear powers. He was pleased to note the Polish representative's remarks concerning the conclusion of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. However, the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States should be taken into account by the nuclear Powers with a view to ensuring that the treaty was fully credible. His delegation was open to all forms of negotiation which registered the positive results of nuclear disarmament and offered safeguards to non-nuclear-weapon States. The Committee's work was aimed at making the treaty universal. He therefore again stressed the importance of its credibility.

15. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) reiterated the general assessment that article VI remained unfulfilled, since negotiations in good faith on one nuclear issue alone (i.e., a comprehensive test ban) had only just begun. None of the relevant multilateral bodies had registered any progress concerning implementation of the provisions of article VI, while nuclear-weapon States were unwilling to commit themselves to achieving the objectives contained in article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12. They also constantly refrained from supporting United Nations resolutions on the subject. Bilateral progress had also been very limited; nuclear-weapon States still needed to reduce their nuclear-weapon stockpiles, which were now larger than in 1968. Ways and means should therefore be found to ensure implementation of article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12, including the setting of an actual date for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race. Nuclear-weapon States should accordingly commit themselves to a programme of action for the total and effective elimination of nuclear weapons within a certain time framework, as well as to the pursuit of negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race as soon as possible.

16. Mr. ERRERA (France), speaking on behalf of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, said that he would be submitting a paper on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. The paper would express satisfaction that the nuclear-arms race had come to an end and that the world was currently engaged in a process of drastically reducing nuclear arsenals; such was the case of the two major nuclear Powers, the United States and the Russian Federation, which had entered into commitments in the context of the START I and II agreements to dismantle the greater part of their nuclear forces. The United Kingdom and France had also made significant reductions in their nuclear programmes. Mention would also be made of the commitment to negotiate, in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus, a comprehensive test-ban treaty which would be universal and internationally and effectively verifiable.

17. Note would also be taken of the fact that for the first time an agreement had been reached to undertake, at the Conference on Disarmament, negotiations on a convention that would ban the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Apart from aspects relating to nuclear disarmament, it was also important to take into account the progress achieved with respect to other weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons and to confidence-building measures, including measures within the regional framework.

18. The Conference should also focus on future prospects in the wake of recent developments which had opened new avenues for the continuation of the disarmament process as envisaged under article VI. That was why the countries on whose behalf he was speaking fervently hoped that in pursuance of the consensus resolutions adopted on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the treaty could be signed and the ban could be implemented as soon as possible. They also hoped that the negotiations on the fissionable materials cut off would begin immediately. They would reaffirm their commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and expressed the hope that efforts would be pursued in other areas of disarmament concerning chemical, biological, anti-personnel mines and within the context of regional arms control processes. The countries on whose behalf he spoke wished to see those drafting proposals reflected in the report to be submitted by the Committee under article VI and the preambular paragraphs.

19. Mr. HASMY (Malaysia) said that negotiations had not been pursued in good faith at all. Indeed, for some 20 years after the coming into force of the non-proliferation Treaty, there has been a frenetic arms race which had slackened off only in the previous five years or so thanks largely to dramatic breakthroughs in the bilateral relations between the two major super-Powers. While the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the United States and the Russian Federation should be commended for their achievements in the area of nuclear arms reduction, it should be noted that the strictly bilateral agreements between them had not reduced nuclear arsenals to a satisfactory level nor did they involve the other three nuclear-weapon States which were yet to take steps to contribute to the process of overall disarmament.

20. Malaysia disagreed with those countries that had tended to take a more positive view of the implementation of article VI. It had taken many years for serious negotiations to get under way and even the current negotiations on

reductions were too dependent on the maintenance of good relations between the two super-Powers. Indeed, Malaysia believed that the current situation was but a lull in the arms race. His delegation was pessimistic about the future as it did not know what would happen should the relationships between the two super-Powers deteriorate. It therefore endorsed the approach suggested by some non-aligned countries that the nuclear-weapon States must be made to commit themselves to a binding schedule of performance designed to reduce nuclear-weapons stockpiles and eventually to eliminate such weapons altogether. That should be one of the goals of the Conference, which should also call upon nuclear-weapon States to abandon once and for all the doctrine of nuclear deterrence which was out of place in the current world context.

21. Mr. OROBOLA (Nigeria) said that article VI was one of the pivotal articles of the non-proliferation Treaty. His delegation agreed with the delegation of Malaysia that, notwithstanding the efforts that had been made in the previous five years by some nuclear-weapon States towards the reduction in their stockpiles, good faith by and large had been lacking. While the efforts that had been made to reduce tactical and strategic nuclear weapons were welcome, much more needed to be done. Despite the efforts that were being made in the context of the Conference on Disarmament, it must be recognized that there were difficulties and that the Conference needed to move speedily in order to conclude and sign a comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1995 - the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations - or 1996 at the latest. With respect to the fissile cut-off, after prolonged discussions, an ad hoc committee had been established. However, there was a problem regarding the interpretation of the Committee's mandate. Moreover, it was unclear how long it would take to negotiate the fissile cut-off. Therefore, while recognizing the fact that problems existed, a way must be found to reflect the need to make rapid progress on all those issues.

22. While the pace of nuclear disarmament was too slow, there were other actions which could be taken by nuclear-weapon States to allay the fears of non-nuclear-weapon States. For instance, the withdrawal by nuclear-weapon States of nuclear weapons stationed on the territories of other countries would give more countries confidence and would demonstrate the further commitment of nuclear-weapon States to the reduction of the nuclear threat. Referring to the link that the Malaysian delegation had established between the state of international relations and nuclear disarmament and noting that the idea of the nuclear doctrine was still very much alive, he said that the Conference should re-examine the issue of whether the nuclear deterrent had a place in a post-cold-war world in search of a new world order.

23. Nigeria believed that the least that could be done was to inform States that were being asked to endorse the indefinite extension of the Treaty as to when nuclear weapons would be eliminated and when some progress on the ongoing negotiations would be achieved. Language should be found in the draft to reflect a time-bound programme of nuclear disarmament and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The twenty-first century should be used to rein in the nuclear threat, stop the making of nuclear weapons and finally come up with a convention to ban the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.

24. Mr. IZQUIERDO (Ecuador) said that non-proliferation was an undeniable responsibility and that it was therefore vital to establish a climate of international trust in order to pursue negotiations in good faith. Ecuador believed that it was necessary to speedily conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty which was universal, multilateral and effectively verifiable. While negotiations on such a treaty were under way, the nuclear-weapon States should renew the moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing.

25. His delegation also deemed it vital for the Conference to promote the conclusion of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty on the banning of the production, possession and marketing of fissionable materials. The illicit traffic in radioactive material should also be stopped because unless timely measures were adopted, such traffic could have unpredictable consequences.

26. Lastly, the non-proliferation Treaty was not an end in and of itself; nor was it designed to perpetuate the possession of nuclear weapons by a small number of States. Rather, it was designed to promote and guarantee international peace and security through nuclear disarmament, a fundamental and essential step towards achieving comprehensive disarmament.

27. Ms. DUNCAN (New Zealand) said that the aim of pursuing negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race was to stop vertical proliferation. The negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty were making an important contribution as they constituted not only a horizontal non-proliferation measure but also one which would contribute to nuclear disarmament. She agreed with the Australian delegation that it should be feasible, with a serious commitment to intensive negotiations by all participants, to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty during the current year. The document which emerged from the Committee's deliberations should reflect that goal. The commitment by all five nuclear-weapon States to the uninterrupted observance of testing moratoria would be consistent with that commitment and a welcome signal of their seriousness.

28. Mr. KIM (Republic of Korea) said that, as it had consistently done in the past, his Government supported the conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the earliest possible date. He agreed with the representatives of Australia and Poland that the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations afforded a unique opportunity for signing the comprehensive test-ban treaty. His delegation hoped that in the not too distant future, the common goal of nuclear disarmament under the Treaty could be achieved as a result of substantial progress through wider participation in the negotiations relating to the comprehensive test-ban treaty. To achieve that goal, however, more intensive efforts were required to resolve the issue of the extension of the Conference on Disarmament at the earliest possible date. Those efforts would contribute greatly to the successful and indefinite extension of the Treaty.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/SR.6
1 May 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

MAIN COMMITTEE I

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 27 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

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REVIEW OF ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 12 (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 12 (continued)

1. Mr. EKWALL (Sweden) said that the positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament must be reflected in the Committee's report. However, the goal must remain a nuclear-weapon-free world.

2. The statements made by his delegation in the general debate of the Conference and in the Committee contained various forward-looking elements pertaining to article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 which his delegation would like reflected in the Committee's report.

3. The Conference should reaffirm that all nuclear weapons must be eliminated from the face of the earth. It should note that the non-proliferation Treaty contained the first and, so far, the only contractual commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate in good faith on nuclear disarmament and that it expected further disarmament negotiations to take place between all the nuclear-weapon States, with a specific time schedule for the implementation of disarmament measures. The Conference should furthermore call for the necessary steps to be taken for the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) to enter into force as soon as possible as a basis for further nuclear disarmament involving all nuclear-weapon States. The Conference should point out that the objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were mutually reinforcing and should be actively pursued together. It should urge those States which had not yet done so to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty.

4. The Conference should also point out that the unilateral declarations by the five nuclear-weapon States could form a basis for a negotiated multilateral treaty on negative security assurances and could be further developed into declarations on the non-first use of nuclear weapons. It should call for the moratoriums on nuclear testing to continue until they could be replaced by an international treaty banning nuclear tests for ever and stress the importance of reaching agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty before the end of 1995. Negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons purposes should start straightaway, covering not only future production but also existing stockpiles.

5. Mr. BERNHARDSEN (Norway) said that his delegation welcomed the progress made in nuclear and conventional disarmament in the context of East-West relations over the past decade. There was an obvious strategic interrelationship between different categories of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, and other weapons of mass destruction; all those categories must be taken into account in assessing the progress made.

6. Regional disarmament reduced the risks of war; the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe had led to a massive reduction of conventional weapons in Europe and represented the cornerstone of the emerging new European security system; it must be fully implemented.

7. Norway was concerned about the limited number of ratifications of the chemical weapons Convention and would welcome a political signal from the Conference urging member States to speed up their ratification process so that the Convention could enter into force at the earliest possible date.

8. The reversal and transformation of the nuclear arms race into a process of nuclear arms control and disarmament was of paramount importance. Norway welcomed the implementation of the START agreements and the political will of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to seek a further agreement.

9. The most urgent task was to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty; Norway hoped for an early conclusion of that treaty, if possible in 1995.

10. Norway welcomed the recent agreement in the Conference on Disarmament on a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes.

11. A broad international effort would be needed to deal with the large-scale military-related environmental damage, affecting entire regions spanning several countries, that was a legacy of the cold war. The disarmament process required strict procedures for the safe handling and storage of nuclear weapons components and weapons-grade fissile material in order to prevent the material from falling into the wrong hands and protect the environment.

12. Mr. KANTOLA (Finland) said that his delegation felt that the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty were the priority task for multilateral disarmament at the current stage, and was disappointed that the importance of the progress made so far in those negotiations had been questioned in the Committee. His delegation felt that the rolling text produced at the end of the first round of negotiations was a significant achievement, and provided a clear structure for the treaty. It hoped that the treaty would be concluded in 1995, if possible on the basis of that text.

13. The difficulties of the negotiations should not be underestimated; the treaty would be of historic importance in preventing the further development of nuclear weapons and that fundamental objective ran through the entire text. Another challenge was effective verification; the establishment of an international monitoring system was an unprecedented task, and it must be effective and cost-efficient. However, the negotiations were proceeding well, and all countries were participating in good faith.

14. Mr. LENARCIC (Slovenia) said that article VI was one of the crucial provisions of the Treaty. Recent progress, especially in respect of the comprehensive test-ban treaty and bilateral arrangements between the Russian Federation and the United States, should be adequately reflected in the Committee's report.

15. However, the implementation of article VI still remained only partial, at best. His delegation associated itself with the New Zealand position regarding vertical proliferation. It agreed that the negotiations on a comprehensive

test-ban treaty were the only negotiations which met the criteria of article VI. While the changed international climate had favourably influenced progress relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the achievements in the area of nuclear disarmament were less than modest. Specific pledges regarding the time-frame of negotiations, on fissile materials for example, would help strengthen confidence.

16. The indefinite extension of the Treaty, which Slovenia firmly supported, would not mean that the negotiations called for in article VI could continue indefinitely. The words "in good faith" implied that those negotiations must yield early results which would be the subject of close scrutiny.

17. Mr. RUSSELL (Ireland) said that in the general debate of the Conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland had outlined six objectives, three of which were directly relevant to the work of the Committee: the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, and concrete steps taken to that end; an end to the testing of nuclear weapons, everywhere, for all time; and a ban on the production and stockpiling of fissile materials for use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

18. The final document of the Conference should refer to the target of eliminating all nuclear weapons. It should also call for further concrete and quantifiable disarmament measures. The Conference should acknowledge that the completion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, if possible by the end of 1995, would realize a major unfulfilled ambition of the Treaty. The Conference should welcome the continuation in force of the moratoriums on nuclear testing by four of the nuclear-weapon States and call on the other nuclear-weapon States to introduce a similar ban.

19. Mr. HAJAYA (Jordan) said that article VI and the related preambular paragraphs established very clear obligations for nuclear-weapon States to end the arms race, achieve nuclear disarmament and conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

20. The nuclear arms race had stopped because the cold war had ended, not because of the Treaty, as evidenced by the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons at the regional level; the threshold countries posed a threat to other countries of the region, as in the case of the Middle East.

21. Despite the progress made at the bilateral level by the two super-Powers in achieving nuclear disarmament, the goal of general and complete disarmament was still a long way off; 25 years should have been long enough to eliminate the stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the world.

22. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would promote nuclear disarmament but it was not the final objective; the means could not be confused with the end. The moratoriums by four nuclear-weapon States were not sufficient; other steps needed to be taken, including a ban on the production of fissile materials.

23. A balance of forces in all regions and between them would help stop the arms race at the regional level. The nuclear-weapon countries which remained

outside the Treaty were a major obstacle to regional disarmament, especially in the Middle East. The Committee's report should stress that the threshold countries must accede to the Treaty and subject their nuclear installations to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) controls. No country could be exempt from its obligations.

24. The international community must take advantage of the post-cold-war period and ensure that future generations were not subjected to the nuclear threat. Nuclear-weapon-based strategies and policies must be abandoned. A timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons must be established as a first step towards general and complete disarmament. A binding treaty on positive and negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was needed.

25. The real enemies of mankind - such as desertification, environmental pollution and disease - could not be defeated by nuclear weapons. The economic resources used for such weapons needed to be devoted to development. The strategy of deterrence and the balance of force must be replaced by cooperation among States for the sake of a peaceful and secure world.

26. Mr. EFFENDI (Indonesia) said that the best way to strengthen the Treaty was for all States parties to abide by its terms. His delegation agreed that article VI had not been implemented since there was still an abundance of nuclear weapons in the world. It welcomed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the START treaties; however, those treaties had not been concluded in implementation of article VI and they did not go far enough.

27. The Conference should approve and endorse specific steps as intermediate measures: a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a legally binding treaty to provide full security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, a "cut-off" convention, and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

28. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) said that his delegation supported document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.10 and, wishing to supplement some of the points made, had introduced document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.12.

29. His delegation was concerned about some of the comments made at the current and previous meetings which dismissed the achievements made in the area of disarmament or even questioned the intentions of the parties. The United States of America had negotiated in good faith in many forums for the entire 25 years of the Treaty's existence. It was pleased that everyone acknowledged the successes registered during the period under review. Many of those achievements had been preceded by years of intensive, laborious efforts to negotiate in good faith to fulfil the obligations under article VI. Given that record and the complexity of the negotiations, his delegation was concerned when unrealistic proposals were made, especially regarding time-bound disarmament. It was in the common interest to work towards a document which reflected concrete and positive advancement in matters of common concern.

30. Mr. ECHARIF (Algeria) said that it should not be surprising that, like many other non-nuclear-weapon States which did not belong to an alliance, Algeria's overall assessment of the fulfilment by nuclear-weapon States of their obligations under article VI was negative. To be frank, it doubted the

sincerity of their commitments and their desire to implement them, based solely on an analysis of their actions since the entry into force of the Treaty. His delegation had listened with interest to the promises for the future, but could base its evaluation only on what had happened over the past 25 years. It must be recognized that, aside from bilateral measures taken by the United States and Russia, the nuclear-weapon States, as defined in article IX, had taken no action even to begin negotiations, much less "pursue" them. Unilateral withdrawal of certain weapons systems had been prompted mainly by budgetary considerations and by changes in doctrines on use of nuclear force, not by commitments under article VI.

31. Although the efforts within the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty were commendable, the new treaty would prohibit only the use of explosions to test nuclear weapons, and not their improvement or the development of new types of weapons not requiring such testing. It seemed that "good faith" was lacking in an approach designed to prevent new nuclear States from emerging, but did not prohibit current nuclear Powers from preserving and improving their nuclear capability. Good faith also seemed lacking in the approach of the nuclear-weapon States to the question of ceasing production of fissionable materials for military uses, due to their attempts to avoid the issue of transparency in the management of existing stocks. Under the proposed treaty, the production of nuclear-weapon States would not be subject to any real control because it could be represented as part of stocks existing at the entry into force of the treaty. Furthermore, illegal traffic in fissionable materials could continue and even escalate. In the current context, his country had few illusions about the ability of the Conference on Disarmament to achieve progress, when the representative of one nuclear State, a depositary of the Treaty, had stated that his country was not willing to discuss nuclear disarmament in the foreseeable future. From Algeria's point of view, prospects for international nuclear disarmament remained uncertain. It had hoped that, with the end of the cold war, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence would be abandoned, but those hopes had been dashed by the recent endorsement of that doctrine by a fourth nuclear Power. The United States and Russia, however, had shown a growing awareness of disarmament issues, which was a positive development.

32. Therefore, Algeria hoped that reason would prevail and that the final document of the Conference would contain specific commitments by the nuclear-weapon States in the areas of disarmament, their plans for their nuclear arsenals, and the date by which they intended to implement the provisions of article VI.

33. Mr. TAMAKA (Japan) drew attention to the draft text submitted by his delegation containing Japan's views on nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, for incorporation into the final report.

34. Mr. PERUGINI (Italy) said that his delegation welcomed the text submitted by the United States and the statement that the nuclear-arms race was being reversed. All nuclear-weapon States should abide by their unilateral commitments and the moratorium on testing until the entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

35. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said that, while his delegation welcomed reductions in nuclear weapons, article VI was more precise, calling for their elimination. It was not clear to him why disarmament must be conducted in stages. The call for a time-bound disarmament framework could not be considered impatience, since 25 years had passed since the Treaty's entry into force. A target date for complete nuclear disarmament was essential.

36. Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) said that nuclear weapons should never have been developed, and the only way to resolve the current world situation was through rapid progress towards their total abolition. When the international community had decided to address the question of chemical and biological weapons, its goal had been their complete elimination, but a different approach to nuclear weapons was favoured by some, who still held fast to the idea that nuclear weapons should remain in the arsenals of a few countries, including their own. The Treaty was not an end in itself, but a means of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. How that goal could be reached was a question that the Parties must answer together.

37. The current state of disarmament negotiations gave rise both to encouragement and concern. The START I and II agreements had been concluded and negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty had begun at last. Debate had also begun on the elimination of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and on various confidence-building measures. Yet there was a great deal of resistance to discussion of a prohibition of future production of nuclear weapons and of existing stocks of fissionable materials. While making efforts to ensure that certain countries could not produce materials for bombs, nothing was said about other countries' production of the same materials. While demanding greater transparency in conventional arms, some States opposed it with regard to nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States had provided unconditional negative security assurances to the parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but they could not do so for all parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. Some nuclear-weapon States, notably China, the former Soviet Union and France, had in the past sought the elimination of nuclear weapons as the only way to end the nuclear threat. That was the path that must be followed.

38. The international community had been told that the nuclear-arms race had ceased and that the Russian Federation and the United States had "undertaken effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament". If that was true, then a series of questions must be answered: If international tension had eased, why, then, had the manufacture of nuclear weapons not ceased? What was the meaning of the phrase "at an early date" in article VI? Were there plans to continue the modernization of existing arsenals? What would be the scope of the nuclear test ban? What would be done with fissionable materials? How would the international community ensure that none would be produced for military use or that such materials would not be diverted from peaceful to military uses? What was being done with the nuclear materials from dismantled weapons? Would the moratorium on nuclear testing continue until the entry into force of the comprehensive test-ban treaty? Would the parties request the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a convention on the elimination of nuclear weapons? His delegation looked forward to hearing the response to those very important questions.

39. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee should consider whether the nuclear-arms race had really ended, or merely abated. The East-West confrontation had been its most visible manifestation, and therefore, it should consider the truth of the assumption that, since the cold war was over, the arms race was also over.

40. Ms. CRITTEMBERGER (United States of America) said that the conference room paper her delegation had submitted addressed that issue. Her delegation did not see the arms race as having abated, but as having ended.

41. Mr. MERNIER (Belgium) said that the Chairman's premise was unacceptable to his delegation. Because it had seen the nuclear weapons deployed in its territory withdrawn and dismantled, in its view, the end of the arms race had been clearly and sufficiently demonstrated.

42. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said that, from a layman's view, the arms race appeared to have ceased among the declared nuclear-weapon States in accordance with article IX, but it was well known that there were other States that appeared to be in the business of producing nuclear weapons.

43. Mr. HASMY (Malaysia) said that his delegation contended that the arms race had merely ceased temporarily. Dramatic arms reductions depended entirely on relations between the two super-Powers. One nuclear Power was still conducting nuclear tests, and others were conducting laboratory simulations.

44. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his delegation's position had been reflected in its statement to the plenary meeting that the arms race had not only halted, but was being reversed. His Government was profoundly convinced that the arms race was over, and if other delegations did not agree, he would welcome information on where it was continuing and between which States. The Russian Federation was not participating in any such activities and did not understand the assertion.

45. Furthermore, the role of the Chairman was not to provoke disagreement but to find common ground, and not to stress the national position of one country as opposed to another.

46. Ms. GUELIL (Germany) took note of the statement made by the Russian delegation and drew attention to paragraph 3 of document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.10. Germany fully endorsed document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.12 submitted by the United States of America.

47. Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) said that his delegation found the current discussions useful. Referring to the first sentence of paragraph 3 of document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.10, he said that it would be useful to conduct a collective exercise to ascertain when the arms race had begun, when it had ceased and to identify the main activities related to the arms race. Once such activities had been pinpointed, it would be possible to ascertain whether or not the arms race had ceased.

48. Mr. SHOUKRY (Egypt) said that his delegation fully supported the manner in which the Chairman was conducting the meeting as it was very healthy to afford

both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States the opportunity to air their views on the various issues before the Committee.

49. Mr. ECHARIF (Algeria) said that the Chairman's approach was a fair one. The Committee should hold collective discussions on the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty. His delegation believed that the Chairman's question could best be answered by the nuclear-weapon States as defined under article IX, paragraph 3 of the Treaty and undeclared nuclear-weapon States which could attend the Conference as observers. Those States could provide information on the number and type of nuclear weapons they intended to have under their future military programmes and what countries they intended to use such weapons against. The Conference could then judge from their answers whether or not the nuclear-arms race had ceased.

50. Mr. HERNANDEZ (Argentina) said that the Chairman's question should be answered by all participants and not by the nuclear-weapon States alone. Argentina fully endorsed document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.12 and believed that not only was the nuclear-arms race over but that it had been reversed. The reduction of nuclear weapons arsenals was proceeding at a satisfactory rate. His delegation did not believe that progress had been frozen on a possible START III. Nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility and Argentina appreciated the course they had undertaken which it felt indicated how future arms reductions could be achieved.

51. Mr. Liu JIEYI (China) said that China did not endorse the policy of nuclear deterrence. The nuclear weapons that had been developed by China were solely for self-defence and were never meant to threaten any country. China had always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and had never taken part in any arms race. It had always exercised the utmost restraint with respect to the development of nuclear weapons and had kept its nuclear arsenal to the minimum level.

52. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) endorsed the remarks made by the representatives of Egypt and Mexico. As to the statement made by the representative of Germany with respect to document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.10, he wondered whether the document's sponsors expected their statements to be automatically endorsed by the Committee.

53. Mr. AL-ANBAKI (Iraq) said that one of the most urgent steps that needed to be taken in order to implement the Treaty was to establish a specific schedule for the reduction of nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination. He endorsed the statements of the non-aligned countries which had recommended inviting members of the Committee to ponder ways and means of verifying whether the arms race was over or not. The Chairman's conduct of the meeting would enhance its deliberations and make it easier for delegations to formulate appropriate recommendations.

54. Mr. EFFENDI (Indonesia) said that, while his delegation appreciated the positive developments that had taken place, it felt that certain steps still needed to be taken in specific areas in order to assist in the reduction of nuclear weapons throughout the world. He endorsed the statement made by the representative of Egypt.

55. Mr. ADEKEYE (Nigeria) said that the arms race was not over; it had only abated. Indeed, one could hardly talk about the end of the nuclear-arms race in a situation where weapons continued to be modernized and the range and payload of missiles continued to be improved. His delegation endorsed the remarks made by the delegations of Mexico, Egypt and Indonesia.

56. Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland) said that the meeting could not but rely on the statement by the nuclear-weapon States which had in fact been involved in the arms race that they were no longer accumulating nuclear weapons but were in fact destroying their stockpiles. The nuclear-arms race had not only ceased but had actually been reversed.

57. Mr. KANTOLA (Finland) said that the discussions were sterile. Document NPT/INF/1995/MC.I/CRP.10 amply testified to the fact that the nuclear-arms race was over. It would be more useful to focus on the challenges ahead and to express concern over the potential nuclear-arms race which might be brewing in the regional context.

58. Mr. HASMY (Malaysia) agreed with previous speakers that the Chairman was conducting the meeting in a wholesome manner by trying to coax delegations to have as wide an exchange of views as possible and that there was no reason for the Chairman to change his approach.

59. Mr. BESANCENOT (France) said that, while it was perfectly legitimate that a certain number of issues should be raised by various participants, it was also very important to try as much as possible to avoid creating dissension and engaging in useless polemics. The Committee should make the most of the little time available to it in order to advance further in the absolutely unprecedented process that had begun in the strategic area and in disarmament.

60. The Conference was both an occasion to welcome the considerable achievements made and to try to evaluate prospects for the future in the most objective and least controversial manner possible. Indeed, as the representative of Argentina had noted, it would be very useful to have everyone's opinion not only on what had been achieved but also on what steps needed to be taken in future.

61. Mr. PERUGINI (Italy) said that he agreed with those delegations which felt that the discussions should be more purpose-oriented. In his delegation's view, the arms race was over. The international community must ensure that the achievements were irreversible. Since the various delegations had differing opinions, the Committee should try to find common political ground and to build on it in order to come up with recommendations which could be endorsed by the Conference.

62. Mr. GAJDA (Hungary) said that disarmament was a dynamic yet relative process which should never be measured in absolute terms. Therefore, while he welcomed the Indonesian statement that, despite the positive changes that had occurred in recent years, much more could have been achieved, he did not agree that the disarmament process had only just begun. Indeed, disarmament agreements were the products of years of arduous negotiations in which all States must participate. It had taken many years to negotiate and conclude the

SALT and START I and II agreements as well as the Intermediate Nuclear Force Reduction Treaty. It was therefore no surprise that the comprehensive test-ban treaty, which he hoped would be ready in 1996, had not yet been concluded. The Committee should therefore look at things in relative terms when assessing achievements over the five-year period under review.

63. The CHAIRMAN, summing up the debate, said that Member States had the sovereign right to review the content of article VI and that, if the purpose of the Conference was simply to endorse the views of Member States on their defence profiles, then the Conference would have no goal at all. The purpose of the meeting had been to move delegations away from their defensive postures. All parties to the Treaty were being asked to justify whether or not they had fulfilled their obligations under article VI. Indeed, the most important thing was that all delegations had a collective duty to themselves as member States parties to the Treaty and were accountable to the international community as a whole. He would ensure that all views were taken into account in order to try to find a way of accommodating the different opinions. The debate had not been sterile. The meeting had reconfirmed the fact that there was disagreement as to whether the nuclear-arms race was actually over.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.